Western Europe
Found in 427 Collections and/or Records:
(Untitled), 06 Apr 1940
(Untitled), 15 Apr 1940
Letter from WSC (Admiralty) to King George VI thanking him for his encouragement and describing plans for the Scandinavian campaign.
(Untitled), 11 Apr 1940
Letter from [Eric] Seal, Private Secretary to WSC, to [Arthur] Rucker [Principal], Private Secretary to Prime Minster, asking for the enclosed memorandum by WSC on military action in Scandinavia to be passed to [Neville] Chamberlain and Lord Halifax [earlier Edward Wood and Lord Irwin, Foreign Secretary]. [carbon with manuscript annotations by WSC; 2 pages extant, subsequent pages not in file].
(Untitled), 09 Apr 1940
Telegram from WSC to Admiral Sir Charles Forbes, Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, asking for clarification of decisions in Norwegian waters and offering information on rapidly changing events. [copy; for draft see CHAR 19/2C/291].
(Untitled), 29 Apr 1940
Letter from [Rear-]Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser [Controller of the Navy] to WSC, criticising the evacuation of Central Norway and giving advice on future Scandinavian movements [annotated "First Lord saw Controller 30/4/40"]; with covering letter from "E A S" [Eric Seal, Principal Private Secretary to First Lord of the Admiralty] to [Arthur] Rucker, [Principal Private Secretary to Prime Minster Neville Chamberlain]. [annotated "recalled before it was shown to the Prime Minister"].
(Untitled), 29 Apr 1940
Letter from [1st] Lord Hankey [Minister without Portfolio] to WSC on Norwegian developments, which they both feel have not gone far enough, enclosing memorandum on the situation and further developments.
(Untitled), 21 Apr 1940
Letter from the Admiral [of the Fleet, 12th] Lord Cork [and Orrery] to WSC on the situation in Scandinavia, particularly Narvik [Norway].
(Untitled), 26 Apr 1940
Letter from Admiral [Sir Roger] Keyes to WSC pressing for action in Norway, asking for authority to lead a Royal Marine assault on Trondheim [Norway].
(Untitled), Apr 1940-May 1940
Letters from [Sir Roger] Keyes to WSC and [Prime Minister] Neville Chamberlain on widespread dissatisfaction with the waging of the naval war, and the recent lack of success at Trondheim fjord and Steinkjer [Norway], mentions previous disasters in the World War I, and intrigue in the intervening years by [Admirals Sir Reginald] Bacon, [1st Lord] Jellicoe, [1st Lord] Beatty, [Sir Charles] Madden and especially [Sir Dudley] Pound [1st Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff].
(Untitled), 06 May 1945
Telegram from AMSSO to 21 Army Group, Forward, passing on a "Personal and Top Secret" message from WSC to Field Marshal [Sir Bernard] Montgomery [Commander 21st Army Group] expressing his concern at delays in the passing of armoured forces into Denmark, asserting the importance of "forestalling" Soviet attempts to gain control of any part of Denmark, and mentioning a "public telegram" of congratulations for Montgomery.
(Untitled), 03 May [1945]
Telegram from War Office to TAC HQ 21 Army Group passing on a "Personal and Secret, also Private" message from WSC to Field Marshal [Sir Bernard] Montgomery [Commander 21st Army Group] stating his pleasure at Montgomery's advance to Lubeck [Germany] and the news that he is to receive the surrender of General Gunther Blumentritt's Army Group and mentioning sending a message of public appreciation.
(Untitled), 26 Feb 1945
Telegram from WSC to Prime Ministers of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa marked "Top Secret and Personal" summarising the major operational decisions reached at the Malta and Yalta [Soviet Union] Conferences: on the U-boat War; operations in North West Europe; strategy in the Mediterranean; operations in the Pacific Area and South East Asia Command; estimating dates for the end of the war against Germany and Japan; and explaining the shipping position. Photocopy.
(Untitled), 09 Mar 1945
Telegram from WSC to General Dwight Eisenhower [Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force in Western Europe, United States Army] marked "personal and Top Secret" congratulating him on the great victory won by the armies under his command [achieving a bridgehead over the Rhine at Remagan, Germany]. Photocopy.
(Untitled), 30 Mar 1945
Telegram from General Dwight Eisenhower [Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force in Western Europe, United States Army] to WSC giving details of his "main thrust" to drive "eastward to join hands with [the] Russians or to attain [the] general line of the Elbe [Germany]"; outlining the main tasks of his commanders in these operations. Annotated with some corrections to the text.
(Untitled), 31 Mar 1945
Telegram from WSC to General Dwight Eisenhower [Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force in Western Europe, United States Army] marked "Private, Confidential, Personal and Top Secret" urging that rather than shifting "the main axis of advance" to the south they should try to advance as far eastward as possible, emphasising the political significance of capturing Berlin [Germany]; and arguing against the withdrawal of the 9th US Army from the 21st Army Group.
(Untitled), 01 Apr 1945
(Untitled), 01 Apr 1945
Telegram from WSC to Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson [Representative of the British Chiefs of Staff in Washington, United States] marked "Personal and Top Secret" requesting that the enclosed message from WSC to President Roosevelt on differences between the British and United States Chiefs of Staff on tactics against Germany [CHAR 20/213A/101-103] is passed on to General George Marshall [Chief of Staff United States Army].
(Untitled), 01 Apr 1945
Telegram from General Dwight Eisenhower [Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force in Western Europe, United States Army] to WSC arguing that he has not changed his plan for the defeat of Germany in Western Europe; that all decisions have been taken for operational reasons; and denying that he intended relegating British forces to a peripheral role.
(Untitled), 02 Apr 1945
(Untitled), 02 Apr 1945
(Untitled), 05 Apr 1945
Telegram from President Roosevelt to WSC marked "Personal and Top Secret" seeking to explain misunderstandings which have occurred over plans for the final assault on Germany: arguing that the manner in which the Allied advance in the West is developing differs little from the plans agreed at Malta and is being determined by the level of German resistance.
(Untitled), 05 Apr 1945
Telegram from President Roosevelt to WSC marked "Personal and Top Secret" repeating a message from Marshal Stalin to Roosevelt alleging that Britain and the United States have negotiated an agreement with the Germans permitting them to advance to the East without opposition; and his reply denying any such agreement.
(Untitled), 05 Apr 1945
(Untitled), 05 Apr 1945
Telegram from WSC to President Roosevelt marked "Personal and Top Secret" stating his surprise at Marshal Stalin's message to Roosevelt [see CHAR 20/214/5-8]; suggesting that the Soviet leaders are disconcerted by the speed of the Allied advance in the West; emphasising the importance of meeting the Soviet armies "as far to the East as possible" and of taking a "firm and blunt stand" on the matter.
(Untitled), 05 Apr 1945
Telegram from WSC to President Roosevelt marked "Personal and Top Secret" repeating the text of his "Personal and Top Secret" message to Marshal Stalin [CHAR 20/214/10-12].