North Africa (general region)
Found in 296 Collections and/or Records:
(Untitled), 13 Dec 1941
Telegram from Major-General Sir Claude Auchinleck Commander- in-Chief, Middle East] to WSC on battle in Libyan desert, Crusader [codename for major British operation in North Africa].
(Untitled), 04 Aug 1941
Telegram from WSC to General Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] expressing a high opinion of General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander-in-Chief, Middle East].
(Untitled), 16 Aug 1941
Telegram from Major-General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander- in-Chief, Middle East] to WSC requesting transfer of Major- General Alan Cunningham [General Officer Commanding East Africa Forces] from East Africa to Libyan Desert.
(Untitled), 21 Aug 1941
Telegram from the Prime Minister of South Africa [General Jan Smuts] to WSC reporting on trip to Middle East with predictions of direction of war in future months.
(Untitled), 23 Aug 1941
Telegram from the British High Commissioner in South Africa [4th Lord Harlech, earlier William Ormsby-Gore] to WSC on his recent visit to Middle East; more tanks needed in Libyan Desert before Germans return from Soviet front; agrees that Imperial War Cabinet a bad idea.
(Untitled), 25 Aug 1941
Telegram from British High Commissioner in South Africa [4th Lord Harlech, earlier William Ormsby-Gore] to WSC on behalf of General Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] suggesting the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Middle East [Major-General Sir Alan Cunningham] attack the Germans in Africa before October.
(Untitled), 06 Nov 1941
Telegrams from Major-General Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, to WSC explaining operation [Crusader, major British operation in North Africa] postponed for 3 days due to need for training of South African division in desert warfare.
(Untitled), 06 Nov 1941
Telegram from Minister of State, Middle East [Oliver Lyttelton, later 1st Lord Chandos] to WSC explaining the reasons of Major- General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander-in-Chief, Middle East], with which he personally disagrees, for delaying the attack [Crusader, major British operation in North Africa].
(Untitled), 15 Nov 1941 - 16 Nov 1941
Telegram from WSC to Major-General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander-in-Chief, Middle East] with a message of confidence from King George VI to all ranks participating in the coming battle [Crusader, codename for major British operation in North Africa]; includes Ministry of Defence note on copying the telegram.
(Untitled), 18 Nov 1941
Telegram from WSC to Major-General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander-in-Chief, Middle East] advising that upon success of Crusader [codename for major British operation in North Africa] an operation could mounted to move 2 and a half divisions into Tunis [Tunisia], Algiers [Algeria] or Morocco at French invitation.
(Untitled), 18 Nov 1941
Telegram from Major-General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander-in-Chief, Middle East] to WSC "no definite news of progress" of Crusader [codename for major British operation in North Africa].
(Untitled), 19 Nov 1941
Telegram from Major-General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander- in-Chief, Middle East] and Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder [Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Middle East] to WSC: Crusader [codename for major British operation in North Africa] satisfactory despite bad weather; they believe Field Marshal Erwin Rommel does not yet appreciate scale of operations.
(Untitled), 20 Nov 1941
Telegram from WSC to the President of the United States [Franklin Roosevelt] on state of offensive in Libya; essential to success to retain General Maxime Weygand [Governor-General of Algeria and Delegate-General of Vichy Government in French Africa], or not to have pro-German, as leader of Vichy France in Africa.
(Untitled), 21 Nov 1941
Telegram from the President of the United States [Franklin Roosevelt] to WSC congratulating him on success in Libya; advises that Marshal Philippe Petain [Chief of French State] has removed General Maxime Weygand [Governor-General of Algeria and Delegate-General of Vichy Government in French Africa] and French High Military Command North Africa will be administered from Vichy potentially giving Germany diplomatic control.
(Untitled), 11 Jan 1942
Telegram from WSC to General Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, asking how the retreat and escape of General Erwin Rommel's Italian troops affects "Acrobat" and also "Gymnast" and "Super-Gymnast" [codenames for an operation against Tripoli, Libya, the plans for the British occupation of North West Africa and a combined landing by British and United States forces].
(Untitled), 12 Jan 1942
(Untitled), 18 Jan 1942
(Untitled), 20 Jan 1942
Telegram from General Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] to WSC on subjects including: congratulating him on his trip [to Washington, United States]; commending the defence of the Far East but insisting on the Middle East and North Africa as the theatre of prime importance; Soviet success against Germany and Hitler's intentions towards Turkey and the Caucasus; making political concessions in India to secure support; improving tanks to German standards.
(Untitled), 24 Jan 1942
(Untitled), 24 Jan 1942
Telegram from Commanders in Chief (Middle East) to WSC giving details of German and Allied army strengths at the beginning of "Crusader" [codename for British North African operation], including details of losses on both sides and reasons for Allied success.
(Untitled), 25 Jan 1942
Telegram from WSC to General Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, expressing his disturbance at the latest news of the evacuation of Benghazi and Derna [Libya]: "The kind of retirement now evidently envisaged by subordinate officers implies the failure of CRUSADER and the ruin of ACROBAT" [codenames for the British North African operation and operation against Tripoli].
(Untitled), 27 Jan 1942
Telegram from General Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander- in-Chief, Middle East, to WSC regarding the latest situation in North Africa, including the premature action at Benghazi [Libya], positions as known on the evening of 26 January, concern over the condition of 1st Armoured division and the conclusion that British armoured forces have failed to compete with the enemy satisfactorily.