North Africa (general region)
Found in 296 Collections and/or Records:
(Untitled), 05 Nov 1942 - 07 Nov 1942
Letter from King George VI to WSC congratulating him on the success of the 8th Army in Egypt [at El Alamein]; with WSC's reply on the value of the King's support and the progress of "Torch" [codename for the Allied invasion of North West Africa] and notes by John Martin and Francis Brown [Private Secretaries to WSC] ascertaining that the King's letter will not be published.
(Untitled), 24 Jan 1942
(Untitled), 28 Jan 1942
Telegram from General Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander- in-Chief, Middle East, to WSC regarding the latest situation in North Africa, including details of troop movements and positions, and the enemy's apparent division of forces in an attempt to secure both Mechili [Al Makili, Libya] and Benghazi.
(Untitled), 18 Feb 1942 - 16 May 1942
(Untitled), 29 Jan 1942
Telegram from General Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander- in-Chief, Middle East, to WSC regarding the latest situation in North Africa, including: the confusion of the situation around Benghazi [Libya] and details of recent fighting not yet received; 1st Armoured division attempted to move on Elabiar but the going was bad and the division is now back at Charubba; Lieutenant- General Neil Ritchie [Commander, 8th Army] aims to stabilise the position and collect forces for a counter-offensive.
(Untitled), 30 Jan 1942
(Untitled), 31 Jan 1942
Telegram from General Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander- in-Chief, Middle East, to WSC regarding the latest situation in North Africa: "Yesterday was uneventful"; gives latest troop positions; is examining future prospect and hopes to send recommendations in 2 or 3 days.
(Untitled), 30 Jul 1942 - 25 Aug 1942
(Untitled), 03 Feb 1942
(Untitled), 14 May 1941
Telegram from General Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] to WSC with detailed assessment of likely German attack: Ukraine Caucasus, Middle East plus French Africa, Britain and the Atlantic. With note in the hand of John Colville [Prime Minister's Private Secretary] that the Dominions Office have asked for this telegram to be circulated to the War Cabinet and Defence Committee.
(Untitled), 15 Mar 1942
Telegram from WSC to General Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief, Middle East: comments on the implications of delaying an attack, particularly for Malta and North Africa and on comparative allied and enemy tank numbers; states that he is sending Sir Stafford Cripps [Lord Privy Seal] to India via Cairo [Egypt] to put across the views of the War Cabinet, accompanied by Lieutenant-General Archibald Nye [Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff].
(Untitled), 15 May 1942
(Untitled), 20 May 1942
(Untitled), 22 May 1942
(Untitled), 26 May 1942
(Untitled), 28 May 1942
(Untitled), 29 May 1942
(Untitled), 28 Jun 1942
(Untitled), 30 Jun 1942 - 01 Jul 1942
Telegram from General Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] to WSC suggesting that the Royal Air Force concentrate its maximum bombing force against the German army and ports in North Africa instead of bombing towns in Germany.
(Untitled), 04 Jul 1942
(Untitled), 05 Jul 1942
Telegram from Air Marshal Arthur Tedder [Air Officer Commander in Chief Mediterranean] to WSC marked "personal" thanking him for his inspiring message: "All of us are determined to do our utmost and more to help the Army to clear the enemy out of Africa.".
(Untitled), 07 Jul 1942
(Untitled), 08 Jul 1942
(Untitled), 13 Jul 1942
Telegram from General Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] to WSC, and repeated to General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander in Chief Middle East] warning of the dangers that would arise from the enemy fortifying the gap between El Alamein and the Qattara depression [Egypt].
(Untitled), 13 Jul 1942
Telegram from General Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] to WSC marked "most secret and personal" regarding the position of the French warships at Alexandria [Egypt], commenting on the implications of threat by Pierre Laval [Head of the government, Vichy France] to declare war if the ships are tampered with, and urging that the ships are only sunk as a last resort.