Asia-Pacific War, 1941-1945
Found in 669 Collections and/or Records:
(Untitled), 11 Dec 1944
Telegram from Major General Albert Wedemeyer [Commander United States Forces in the China Theatre] to WSC appreciating his support over the diversion of air and ground forces from operations in Burma [later Myanmar] for employment in China.
(Untitled), 18 Dec 1944
Telegram from WSC to John Curtin [Prime Minister of Australia] marked "Top Secret and Personal" stating that the arrival of the main part of the British Pacific Fleet in Australia will be delayed by two or three weeks through assisting Admiral Chester Nimitz [Commander in Chief United States Pacific Fleet] and General Douglas MacArthur [Commander in Chief Philippines, Supreme Commander South West Pacific] in their operations.
(Untitled), 31 Dec 1944
Telegram from General Herbert Lumsden [Liaison Officer at General MacArthur's Headquarters] to WSC marked "Private and personal" stating that the Philippine Islands campaign is progressing favourably; but that General Douglas MacArthur [Commander in Chief Philippines, Supreme Commander South West Pacific] objects strongly to the removal of 70 Liberty Ships over the next two months.
(Untitled), 06 Jan 1944
Telegram from WSC [Marrakesh, Morocco] to the Chiefs of Staff stating that although he shares their feelings on the matter, he thinks they should order the three landing craft back to the Indian Ocean to avoid a row with the United States; detailing disputes over Pigstick [Allied advance toward Akyab, Burma, later Myanmar]; and suggesting that a "Y moon" [June date] will be chosen for Overlord [invasion of Normandy, France]. Marked: "From Sextant".
(Untitled), 10 Jan 1944
Telegram from WSC [Marrakesh, Morocco] to Lord Louis Mountbatten [later Lord Mountbatten of Burma, Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia] marked "Most personal, secret and private" explaining his lack of support for Buccaneer [projected Allied operation against the Andaman Islands]; questioning the military advice given to Mountbatten; and telling him to concentrate on First Culverin [attack on the Japanese-held Dutch East Indies, later Indonesia]. Marked: "From Sextant".
(Untitled), 12 Aug 1944 - 26 Sep 1944
The War in the Pacific: Telegrams exchanged between the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister of Australia [John Curtin] and General Douglas MacArthur [Commander in Chief Philippines, Supreme Commander South West Pacific]: printed.
(Untitled), 23 Feb 1944
(Untitled), 01 Mar 1944
WSC's copy of a government paper for the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the War Cabinet marked "Most Secret" entitled "Strategy for the War against Japan" including report intended to clear up some misunderstandings in regard to the plan for the defeat of Japan; with appendices and maps. Flagged: "H".
(Untitled), 29 Apr 1944
Summary prepared for WSC by General Sir Hastings Ismay [Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence] marked "Top Secret" on the controversy about strategy for the war against Japan; referring to flagged supporting papers contained in remainder of CHAR 20/188. Signed.
(Untitled), 29 Feb 1944
Copy of a government paper marked "Most Secret" entitled "Note by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence" [WSC] on strategy for the war against Japan. Annotated: "Revised proof no. 3". Flagged: "I".
(Untitled), 03 Mar 1944
WSC's copy of a government paper for the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the War Cabinet marked "Most Secret" entitled "Overall Plan for the defeat of Japan - Communication to Dominions" including copies of minutes from General Sir Hastings Ismay [Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence] to WSC; and WSC to Ismay. Flagged: "J".
(Untitled), 05 Mar 1944
Copy of a government paper for the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the War Cabinet marked "Most Secret" entitled "Strategy for the war against Japan" including copy of minute from WSC to the Chiefs of Staff. Flagged: "K".
(Untitled), 05 Mar 1944
Copy of a preliminary note from the Minister of War Transport [Lord Leathers] to WSC on the strategic implications of shifting the British centre of gravity against Japan from Indian to Australian waters. Flagged: "L".
(Untitled), 08 Mar 1944
WSC's copy of a government paper for the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the War Cabinet marked "Most Secret" entitled "Strategy for the war against Japan" including a copy of a minute from the Chiefs of Staff to WSC replying to his minute on the subject [see CHAR 20/188A/25]. Flagged: "M".
(Untitled), 08 Mar 1944
Copy of a government paper for the Joint Planning Staff of the War Cabinet marked "Most Secret" entitled "Overall Plan for the defeat of Japan - India and Australia as bases" including report by Joint Planning Staff and annexes on Navy, Army and RAF facilities. Flagged: "M1".
(Untitled), 08 Mar 1944
Commentary for WSC by Chiefs of Staff marked "Most Secret" replying to his note on strategy for the war against Japan [CHAR 20/188A/22]. Carbon copy. Flagged: "N".
(Untitled), 08 Mar 1944
(Untitled), 11 Mar 1944
Telegram from WSC to Prime Minister of Australia [John Curtin] marked "Most Secret and Personal" suggesting the sending to Australia of small parties of administrative experts to study the potential for bases there. Flagged: "P".
(Untitled), 14 Mar 1944
Telegram from Field Marshal Sir John Dill [Representative of the British Chiefs of Staff in Washington, United States] to the Chiefs of Staff marked "Personal" passing on American Joint Staff Directive outlining a much accelerated programme for the United States advance in the Pacific. Flagged: "Q".
(Untitled), 14 Mar 1944
Minute from WSC to General Sir Hastings Ismay [Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence] for the Chiefs of Staff Committee marked "Secret" repeating a question from WSC to President Roosevelt and Roosevelt's reply that a British Fleet detachment was unlikely to be needed for an American operation in the Pacific before the summer of 1945. Copy. Flagged: "R".
(Untitled), 16 Mar 1944
Minute from General Sir Hastings Ismay [Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence] to WSC marked "Secret" stating that the opinion of President Roosevelt on the requirement for a detachment of the British Fleet in the Pacific should not be taken as final; but that the decision should be determined by the contribution which they could make to the strategy best calculated to bring about the early defeat of Japan. Flagged: "S".
(Untitled), 23 Dec 1943
Copy of government paper for the Combined Chiefs of Staff marked "Most Secret" entitled "Overall Plan for the Defeat of Japan" including a report by the Combined Staff Planners and annexes. Flagged: "A".
(Untitled), 20 Mar 1944
Minute from WSC to the Chiefs of Staff marked "Secret" reviewing the differences between himself and the Chiefs of Staff and stating that he feels it his duty to give certain rulings, including the maintenance of the "Bay of Bengal strategy" [as the centre of gravity for British and Imperial war effort against Japan] and the sending of a reconnaissance mission to Australia. For carbon draft see CHAR 20/188B/136-140.
(Untitled), 21 Mar 1944
(Untitled), 05 Feb 1944
WSC's copy of a government paper for the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the War Cabinet marked "Most Secret" entitled "Plans for the Defeat of Japan" including a resume of the "Strategic Considerations leading up to the Selection of the Pacific Plan for the Defeat of Japan" and annexes. Flagged: "B, C and D".