Asia-Pacific War, 1941-1945
Found in 670 Collections and/or Records:
(Untitled), 16 Feb 1944
WSC's copy of a government paper for the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the War Cabinet marked "Most Secret" entitled "Operations in South-East Asia and the Pacific" including observations by WSC on COS (44)123(O) [CHAR 20/188A/7]. Flagged: "E".
(Untitled), 23 Feb 1944
WSC's copy of a government paper for the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the War Cabinet marked "Most Secret" entitled "South East Asia - Future Operations" including copies of minutes from WSC to the Chiefs of Staff Committee; Foreign Secretary [Anthony Eden, later Lord Avon] to WSC; and a memorandum from Esler Dening [Chief Political Adviser to the Supreme Commander South East Asia]. Flagged: "F".
(Untitled), 28 Mar 1944
(Untitled), 28 Mar 1944
Minute from Chiefs of Staff to WSC marked "Private and Top Secret" explaining that they have not committed themselves to any fixed strategy in the Far East and stating their reasons for preferring the "South West Pacific" to the "Bay of Bengal" policy [as the centre of gravity for British and Imperial war effort against Japan]. Flagged: "Y". Copy of CHAR 20/188B/128-132.
(Untitled), 27 Apr 1944
(Untitled), 21 Apr 1944
WSC's copy of a government paper for the Principal Administrative Officers Committee of the War Cabinet marked "Top Secret" entitled "Potentialities of India as a base" including a report to the Chiefs of Staff by the Principal Administrative Officers concluding that risks would be involved in using India as a base for the full programme required by the "Bay of Bengal" strategy [as the centre of gravity for British and Imperial war effort against Japan]. Flagged: "AA".
(Untitled), 25 Apr 1944
(Untitled), 28 Mar 1944
(Untitled), 20 Mar 1944
Minute from WSC to the Chiefs of Staff marked "Secret" reviewing the differences between himself and the Chiefs of Staff and stating that he feels it his duty to give certain rulings, including the maintenance of the "Bay of Bengal strategy" [as the centre of gravity for British and Imperial war effort against Japan] and the sending of a reconnaissance mission to Australia. Initialled. Carbon draft with annotations. For copy of final minute see CHAR 20/188A/64-68.
(Untitled), 19 Mar 1944
(Untitled), [19] [Mar] [1944]
Draft notes for minute from WSC to General Sir Hastings Ismay [Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence]. See CHAR 20/188B/141-145.
(Untitled), 19 Mar 1944
(Untitled), 16 Mar 1944
Minute from General Sir Hastings Ismay [Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence] to WSC marked "Secret" stating that the opinion of President Roosevelt on the requirement for a detachment of the British Fleet in the Pacific should not be taken as final; but that the decision should be determined by the contribution which they could make to the strategy best calculated to bring about the early defeat of Japan. Annotated. Signed.
(Untitled), 16 Mar 1944
Minute from General Sir Hastings Ismay [Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence] to WSC marked "Secret" stating that the opinion of President Roosevelt on the requirement for a detachment of the British Fleet in the Pacific should not be taken as final; but that the decision should be determined by the contribution which they could make to the strategy best calculated to bring about the early defeat of Japan. Carbon copy. Annotated. Signed.
(Untitled), 14 Mar 1944
Minute from WSC to General Sir Hastings Ismay [Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence] for the Chiefs of Staff Committee marked "Secret" repeating a question from WSC to President Roosevelt and Roosevelt's reply that a British Fleet detachment was unlikely to be needed for an American operation in the Pacific before the summer of 1945. Manuscript annotations. Initialled. Flagged: "A".
(Untitled), 14 Mar 1944
Minute from WSC to General Sir Hastings Ismay [Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence] for the Chiefs of Staff Committee marked "Secret" repeating a question from WSC to President Roosevelt and Roosevelt's reply that a British Fleet detachment was unlikely to be needed for an American operation in the Pacific before the summer of 1945. Copy.
(Untitled), 13 Mar 1944
Telegram from President Roosevelt to WSC marked "Personal and Secret" stating that a British Fleet detachment is unlikely to be needed for an American operation in the Pacific before the summer of 1945. Annotated on behalf of WSC.
(Untitled), Mar 1944
Map of Indian Ocean and East Indies marked "Most Secret" with Allied air reconnaissance and air strike distances, Allied ships and convoys, and estimated areas into which Japanese forces might penetrate indicated.
(Untitled), Mar 1944
Map of Australasia marked "Most Secret" with Japanese supply routes and areas where the British and American Forces will operate if the British Fleet moves into the Pacific area indicated.
(Untitled), 29 Feb 1944
Copy of a government paper marked "Most Secret" entitled "Note by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence" [WSC] on strategy for the war against Japan. Flagged: "G".
(Untitled), 01 Mar 1944
WSC's copy of a government paper for the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the War Cabinet marked "Most Secret" entitled "Strategy for the War against Japan" including report intended to clear up some misunderstandings in regard to the plan for the defeat of Japan; with appendices. Flagged: "F".
(Untitled), 05 Feb 1945 - 28 Feb 1945
(Untitled), 01 May 1945 - 31 May 1945
(Untitled), 04 Jan 1945
Telegram from Lord Louis Mountbatten [later Lord Mountbatten of Burma, Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia] to WSC marked "Personal" reporting on the situation in Burma [later Myanmar]: that the advance has carried them into Akyab Island [Burma] and Yeu [Burma] has been captured. Photocopy.
(Untitled), 08 Dec 1942
Telegram from John Curtin [Prime Minister of Australia] to WSC marked "most secret and personal" regarding the return of the Australian 9th Division from the Middle East: Comments on the campaign in New Guinea [later Papua New Guinea and part of Indonesia] and its implications for Australian manpower; lists essential equipment which should be shipped back to Australia with the troops; comments on communication with President Roosevelt.