Telegram from WSC to Lord Louis Mountbatten [later Lord Mountbatten of Burma, Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia] marked "Personal and Private" suggesting that it is made clear to the Chinese Government how grateful the British Government is for their contribution to the success of operations in Burma [later Myanmar].

Telegram from Lord Louis Mountbatten [later Lord Mountbatten of Burma, Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia] to WSC marked "Personal" stating that he has just returned from India; he is ready to meet WSC whenever; he is shocked at the "cancellation" of Operation Dracula [Allied attack on the Rangoon area, Burma, later Myanmar] and feels the failure to provide extra forces may permanently injure the British position in the Far East and have a great effect on morale.

Telegram from WSC to President Roosevelt marked "Personal, Private and Top Secret" stating that there has been a good atmosphere at the Moscow talks; that he and Roosevelt need to agree on a joint policy towards the Balkan countries; that he needs an account of what part of the Pacific operations he can mention to Marshal Stalin; that he believes Stalin will declare war on Japan as soon as Germany is defeated.

Telegram from General Sir Adrian Carton de Wiart [Special Military Representative with Chiang Kai Shek] to WSC marked "Personal" stating that Chiang Kai Shek cannot at that time consent to General Sir Oliver Leese [Commander of the Eighth Army] exercising Command [of Allied Land Forces in South East Asia].

Telegram from General Sir Adrian Carton de Wiart [Special Military Representative to Chiang Kai Shek] to WSC marked "Top Secret" stating that Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell [Commander of the United States Army in China, Burma (later Myanmar) and India] has been recalled from command in China.

Telegram from WSC and General Sir Alan Brooke [later Lord Alanbrooke of Brookeborough, Chief of Imperial General Staff] to General Douglas MacArthur [Commander in Chief Phillipines, Supreme Commander South West Pacific] congratulating him on his invasion of Leyte [Philippines].

Telegram from President Roosevelt to WSC marked "Personal and Top Secret" repeating text of announcement recalling Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell to Washington from his post as Commander of the United States Army Forces in China, Burma [later Myanmar] and India and Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai Shek [President of China].

WSC's copy of a government paper for the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the War Cabinet marked "Most Secret" entitled "Strategy for the war against Japan" including a copy of a minute from the Chiefs of Staff to WSC replying to his minute on the subject [see CHAR 20/188A/25]. Flagged: "M".

Copy of a government paper for the Joint Planning Staff of the War Cabinet marked "Most Secret" entitled "Overall Plan for the defeat of Japan - India and Australia as bases" including report by Joint Planning Staff and annexes on Navy, Army and RAF facilities. Flagged: "M1".

Commentary for WSC by Chiefs of Staff marked "Most Secret" replying to his note on strategy for the war against Japan [CHAR 20/188A/22]. Carbon copy. Flagged: "N".

Telegram from WSC to Prime Minister of Australia [John Curtin] marked "Most Secret and Personal" suggesting the sending to Australia of small parties of administrative experts to study the potential for bases there. Flagged: "P".

Telegram from Field Marshal Sir John Dill [Representative of the British Chiefs of Staff in Washington, United States] to the Chiefs of Staff marked "Personal" passing on American Joint Staff Directive outlining a much accelerated programme for the United States advance in the Pacific. Flagged: "Q".

Minute from WSC to General Sir Hastings Ismay [Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence] for the Chiefs of Staff Committee marked "Secret" repeating a question from WSC to President Roosevelt and Roosevelt's reply that a British Fleet detachment was unlikely to be needed for an American operation in the Pacific before the summer of 1945. Copy. Flagged: "R".

Minute from General Sir Hastings Ismay [Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence] to WSC marked "Secret" stating that the opinion of President Roosevelt on the requirement for a detachment of the British Fleet in the Pacific should not be taken as final; but that the decision should be determined by the contribution which they could make to the strategy best calculated to bring about the early defeat of Japan. Flagged: "S".

Copy of government paper for the Combined Chiefs of Staff marked "Most Secret" entitled "Overall Plan for the Defeat of Japan" including a report by the Combined Staff Planners and annexes. Flagged: "A".

Minute from WSC to the Chiefs of Staff marked "Secret" reviewing the differences between himself and the Chiefs of Staff and stating that he feels it his duty to give certain rulings, including the maintenance of the "Bay of Bengal strategy" [as the centre of gravity for British and Imperial war effort against Japan] and the sending of a reconnaissance mission to Australia. For carbon draft see CHAR 20/188B/136-140.

WSC's copy of a government paper for the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the War Cabinet marked "Most Secret" entitled "Plans for the Defeat of Japan" including a resume of the "Strategic Considerations leading up to the Selection of the Pacific Plan for the Defeat of Japan" and annexes. Flagged: "B, C and D".

Telegram from Lord Louis Mountbatten [later Lord Mountbatten of Burma, Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia] to Chiefs of Staff commenting on a message from the United States Chiefs of Staff [see CHAR 20/188A/72-74] on strategy in his theatre. Flagged: "W".