Armed forces
Found in 991 Collections and/or Records:
(Untitled), 29 Jun 1942
Telegram from Middle East Defence Committee to WSC and Chiefs of Staff marked "most secret and personal" regarding their urgent need for Boston aircraft and requesting permission to appropriate 50 of these aircraft from Basra [Iraq] where they are waiting collection by the Russians.
(Untitled), 30 Jun 1942
Telegram from John Curtin (Prime Minister of Australia) to WSC marked "most secret" agreeing to diversion of Spitfires to the Middle East but expressing disappointment and stressing that the delay should not be allowed to intefere with the quota for monthly wastage.
(Untitled), 01 Jul 1942
Telegram from Minister of State in the Middle East [Richard Casey] to WSC marked "personal and most secret" asking for his help in getting the Boston aircraft from Basra [Iraq] for use in Egypt.
(Untitled), 03 Jul 1942
Telegram from WSC to Evatt [Australian Minister for External Affairs and Attorney General] apologising for the delay in the provision of Spitfires to Australia.
(Untitled), 03 Jul 1942
Telegram from WSC to John Curtin [Prime Minister of Australia] thanking him for his agreement regarding the diversion of 42 Spitfires to the Middle East but asking him to accept the July allocation for wastage in two instalments.
(Untitled), 04 Jul 1942
Telegram from WSC to President Roosevelt regarding the urgent need for Boston bomber aircraft in the Middle East and asking for permission to have the forty Bostons in Basra [Iraq] which were en route to the Soviet Union.
(Untitled), 06 Jul 1942
Telegram from WSC to General Sir Archibald Wavell [Commander in Chief India] marked "personal and secret" questioning Wavell's reasons for delaying offensive operations from India and his request for 1150 first-line aircraft.
(Untitled), 07 Jul 1942
Telegram from John Curtin (Prime Minister of Australia) to WSC marked "most secret" accepting WSC's amended proposals regarding the monthly delivery of Spitfires and describing Japanese raid no. 67 on Port Moresby [Papua New Guinea] on 4 July.
(Untitled), 07 Jul 1942
Telegram from President Roosevelt to WSC confirming that Stalin has no objection to the transfer of the forty Bostons from Basra [Iraq] to Egypt and that instructions have gone forward to transfer the planes at once.
(Untitled), 08 Jul 1942
(Untitled), 09 Jul 1942
Telegram from WSC to Premier Stalin thanking him for consenting to the transfer of the 40 Boston bombers from Basra [Iraq] to Egypt.
(Untitled), 09 Jul 1942
Telegram from WSC to President Roosevelt thanking him for arranging the transfer of the 40 Boston bombers from Basra [Iraq] to Egypt.
(Untitled), 09 Jul 1942
Telegram from Evatt [Australian Minister of External Affairs and Attorney General] marked "most secret" to WSC thanking him for his "thoughtful wire", commenting on plan to provide Spitfires for Australia, and stating that a black swan has been allocated to WSC and will arrive after plumage attaches itself in August.
(Untitled), 04 Oct 1942
(Untitled), 03 Oct 1942
Telegram from Premier Stalin to WSC marked "personal and secret" informing him of the deterioration of the situation in the Stalingrad area [Soviet Union] since the beginning of September, due to German air superiority, and asking for supplies of fighter aircraft from Great Britain and the United States. Claims that Germany are manufacturing not less than 2500 combat aircraft a month, far more than the 1300 suggested by British intelligence.
(Untitled), 06 Oct 1942
Telegram from WSC to President Roosevelt marked "personal and secret" reciting text of telegram from Stalin to WSC regarding the deterioration of the situation at Stalingrad [Soviet Union] and requesting supplies of fighter aircraft from Great Britain and the United States [see CHAR 20/80/126-127].
(Untitled), 06 Oct 1942
Telegram from President Roosevelt to WSC commenting on WSC's proposed text of message for Stalin: advocates a firm commitment to putting an air force in the Caucasus; argues that shipping convoy PQ19 must sail to the Soviet Union and comments on how this might be achieved; refers to his anxiety about a forthcoming message from the United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union.
(Untitled), 07 Oct 1942
Telegram from President Roosevelt to WSC marked "secret" stating that the United States is prepared to send a heavy bomber group to "Velvet" [codename for proposed Anglo-American air force on Soviet southern flank] and that Great Britain would provide the fighters and medium or light bombers.
(Untitled), 07 Oct 1942
(Untitled), 07 Oct 1942
(Untitled), 08 Oct 1942
Telegram from President Roosevelt to WSC regarding assistance for the Soviet Union: agrees with WSC's proposals for delivering supplies by the northern route; comments on the need to make a firm commitment to the joint Anglo-American air force on the Russian front [Codename "Velvet"]; suggests amendments to WSC's proposed telegram to Stalin.
(Untitled), 08 Oct 1942
(Untitled), 08 Oct 1942
Telegram from WSC to President Roosevelt marked "most secret and personal" reciting text of his telegram to Stalin regarding Allied support for the Soviet Union [see CHAR 20/81/18-20] With annotations by ? Commander Charles Thompson [Personal Assistant to the Minister of Defence].
(Untitled), 09 Oct 1942
Telegram from President Roosevelt to WSC marked "personal and most secret" reciting text of message to Stalin outlining the ways in which the United States can help the Soviet Union. Refers to: placing an air force under Soviet command in the Caucasus [codename "Velvet"]; arranging transfer of merchant ships; making an automobile tyre plant available; sending reinforcements of troops and supplies to the Persian Gulf.
(Untitled), 09 Oct 1942
Telegram from WSC to Harry Hopkins [Special Adviser and Assistant to the President of the United States] marked "personal and secret" stating that he considers it more important than ever that Hopkins should come over at once as important decisions on the air programme are about to be taken.