International tensions
Found in 194 Collections and/or Records:
(Untitled), [May] [1945]
Reminder note for WSC about a message for Marshal Stalin which reads: "I always hope our personal relationship will surmount many difficult and national problems which concern us." [annotated by WSC].
(Untitled), 12 Sep 1944
(Untitled), 11 May 1945
Telegram from WSC to Anthony Eden [later Lord Avon, Foreign Secretary, San Francisco, United States] marked "Personal and Top Secret" expressing concern at the possible withdrawal of American troops from Europe and British demobilisation, leaving the Soviet Union in the dominant position; and stating that these issues are more important than a "world constitution which may never come into being till it is superseded after a period of appeasement by a third world war".
(Untitled), 11 May 1945
(Untitled), 12 May 1945
Telegram from Foreign Secretary [Anthony Eden, later Lord Avon] (San Francisco [United States]) to WSC marked "Top Secret" agreeing that a June election would suit the Conservative Party better than an October one; and arguing that this date would also be advantageous in respect to foreign affairs, indicating his fears for future stability in this sphere. Copy.
(Untitled), 12 May 1945
Telegram from WSC to President Harry Truman marked "Personal and Top Secret" expressing his concern over the future strength of the Soviet Union in Europe and what is going on behind the "iron curtain" of the Soviet Front; and asserting the importance of them coming to an "understanding" with the Soviet Union before they withdraw significant forces from Europe and retire to their zones of occupation.
(Untitled), 12 May 1945 - 13 May 1945
(Untitled), 09 Jun 1945
Telegram from WSC to President Harry Truman marked "Personal and Top Secret" suggesting that they refuse to withdraw the American and British forces in Germany to the agreed occupation line until an agreement is reached on the zones of occupation in Austria.
(Untitled), 09 Jun 1945
Telegram from WSC to Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander [later 1st Lord Alexander of Tunis, Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean Theatre] marked "Personal and Top Secret" repeating the text of his message to President Harry Truman suggesting that they refuse to withdraw the American and British forces in Germany to the agreed occupation line until an agreement is reached on the zones of occupation in Austria.
(Untitled), 05 Jun 1945
Telegram from WSC to President Harry Truman marked "Personal and Top Secret" agreeing with the delay over delivering Truman's message to Stalin [on establishing relations with Finland, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria], but emphasising that the problem over the Western Allies and the Soviet Union's battle for influence in Europe "will come up in its good time".
(Untitled), 28 Apr 1945
(Untitled), 29 Apr 1945
(Untitled), 04 May 1945
(Untitled), 05 Jul 1943
(Untitled), [Oct 1945]
(Untitled), 10 Oct 1946
Copy of a letter from WSC to Clement Attlee, Prime Minister, marked "personal and private" thanking him for his draft speech on the Roosevelt Memorial Bill; promising to write again about a publication; and discussing demobilisation figures and the possibility of war with the Soviet Union, noting that the Russians are hampered by two reasons "their virtue and self restraint. The second, the possession by the United States of the Atomic bomb."Carbon typescript signed with initials.
(Untitled), 06 Oct 1946
(Untitled), 4-6 Aug 1950
(Untitled), 2-3 Dec 1950
(Untitled), 24 Mar 1951
Letter from Harry Truman [President of the United States] (The White House, Washington) to WSC explaining that he does not wish to publish the Quebec Agreement as requested by WSC because it will lead to requests for information about the current status of collaboration between the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States and that this would jeopardise the countries and NATO Allies.Signed typescript.
(Untitled), 16 Feb 1951
(Untitled), 12 Feb 1951
Copy of a letter from WSC to the President of the United States [Harry Truman] asking for the publication of the 1943 Quebec Agreement, arguing that the British Parliament should have access to the facts, that consent from the British government would be needed to use the US air bases in East Anglia for the atomic bomb and this would strengthen the ties between the two countries. He ends by congratulating [Truman] on events in Korea and the Eisenhower mission. Unsigned carbon typescript.