Telegram from WSC to General Sir Henry Wilson [later 1st Lord Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean Theatre] marked "Personal and Top Secret" stating that United States landing craft should disengage from the Adriatic in time to make their way to the Indian Ocean, where they will be required for Operation Dracula [Allied attack on the Rangoon area, Burma, later Myanmar] and requesting plan from Wilson.

Telegram from WSC to Field Marshal 1st Lord Wavell [earlier Sir Archibald, Viceroy of India] marked "Personal and Top Secret" recommending that he object strongly to any suggestions that may be made in Council implying that it will be necessary to "bribe" British forces to fight in the Far East.

Telegram from General Sir Henry Wilson [later 1st Lord Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean Theatre] to WSC marked "Top Secret and Personal" requesting date by which United States landing craft from the Adriatic must reach Colombo [Sri Lanka] for Operation Dracula [Allied attack on the Rangoon area, Burma, later Myanmar] and suggesting that this leaves little time for an operation against Istria [Italy] which would also require the craft. Copy.

Telegram from WSC to President Roosevelt marked "Personal, Private and Top Secret" informing him that Anthony Eden [later Lord Avon, Foreign Secretary] and he will be starting their journey to Moscow on 7 October; requesting that Roosevelt send a message approving the mission to Marshal Stalin; stating that he wants to find out more about Soviet intentions in the Far East; that the main talks will be about Poland; that Dumbarton Oaks [Washington, United States] will be discussed. Copy.

Telegram from WSC to Lord Louis Mountbatten [later Lord Mountbatten of Burma, Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia] marked "Personal and Private" suggesting that it is made clear to the Chinese Government how grateful the British Government is for their contribution to the success of operations in Burma [later Myanmar].

Telegram from Lord Louis Mountbatten [later Lord Mountbatten of Burma, Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia] to WSC marked "Personal" stating that he has just returned from India; he is ready to meet WSC whenever; he is shocked at the "cancellation" of Operation Dracula [Allied attack on the Rangoon area, Burma, later Myanmar] and feels the failure to provide extra forces may permanently injure the British position in the Far East and have a great effect on morale.

Telegram from WSC to President Roosevelt marked "Personal, Private and Top Secret" stating that there has been a good atmosphere at the Moscow talks; that he and Roosevelt need to agree on a joint policy towards the Balkan countries; that he needs an account of what part of the Pacific operations he can mention to Marshal Stalin; that he believes Stalin will declare war on Japan as soon as Germany is defeated.

Telegram from General Sir Adrian Carton de Wiart [Special Military Representative with Chiang Kai Shek] to WSC marked "Personal" stating that Chiang Kai Shek cannot at that time consent to General Sir Oliver Leese [Commander of the Eighth Army] exercising Command [of Allied Land Forces in South East Asia].

Telegram from Lord Louis Mountbatten [later Lord Mountbatten of Burma, Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia] to WSC marked "Top Secret" stating that attempts to reduce the numbers of servicemen required for Operation Dracula [Allied attack on the Rangoon area, Burma] are proving difficult and indicating that when the Japanese army in Burma [later Myanmar] attempted to operate without a significant backup they were defeated. Copy.

Telegram from President Roosevelt to WSC marked "Personal and Top Secret" requesting the date of WSC's arrival in Moscow when it has been agreed; suggesting that Marshal Stalin is sensitive about Soviet assistance in the Far East being questioned; indicating that he will give further consideration to the problem of French Provisional Government following German expulsion. Copy.

Copy of a letter from WSC to [Sir Edward] Campbell [Parliamentary Private Secretary at the Ministry of Health] informing him that his suggested parliamentary question about the role of British forces in the Far East would not be helpful at present.Carbon typescript signed in pencil.

Telegram from Chiang-Kai-shek [President of China] to WSC offering the heartiest congratulations of the Chinese Nation on the occasion of the triumphant entry of Allied troops into Berlin [Germany]: expresses conviction that the "heroic efforts of your armed forces will be attended with equally brilliant successes in the Far East in their struggle with the Japanese aggressors" [copy].

Proposed text of telegram from WSC to Chiang-Kai-shek [President of China] to WSC thanking him for his telegram of congratulations on the occasion of the triumphant entry of Allied troops into Berlin [Germany], and confirming that: "our endeavours will not slacken until Tokio [Tokyo, Japan] has been entered as well as Berlin." [copy, see also CHAR 20/195B/189 & 193].

Draft of telegram from WSC to Chiank-Kai-Shek [President of China] thanking him for his message of congratulations on the occasion of the entry of Allied troops into Berlin [Germany] and confirming that: "our endeavours in the joint cause will not slacken until Tokio [Tokyo, Japan] has been entered as well as Berlin." [typescript] Annotated and initialled by WSC in red [see CHAR 20/195B/193 for final version].

Telegram from Chiank-Kai-Shek [President of China] to WSC conveying congratulations of the entire Chinese Nation on the occasion of the entry of Allied troops into Berlin [Germany] and expressing the conviction that: "the heroic efforts of your Armed Forces will be attended with equally brilliant successes in the Far East in their struggle with the Japanese aggressors".

Telegram from WSC to Chiang-Kai-Shek [President of China] thanking him for his telegram of congratulations on the occasion of the entry of "our Soviet Allies" into Berlin [Germany]; commenting on the victory gained by Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander [later Lord Alexander of Tunis, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre] in Italy; expressing conviction that "our endeavours in the joint cause will not slacken until the last enemy has been beaten down".

Minute from General Sir Hastings Ismay [Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence] to WSC marked "Secret" stating that the opinion of President Roosevelt on the requirement for a detachment of the British Fleet in the Pacific should not be taken as final; but that the decision should be determined by the contribution which they could make to the strategy best calculated to bring about the early defeat of Japan. Annotated. Signed.

Minute from General Sir Hastings Ismay [Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence] to WSC marked "Secret" stating that the opinion of President Roosevelt on the requirement for a detachment of the British Fleet in the Pacific should not be taken as final; but that the decision should be determined by the contribution which they could make to the strategy best calculated to bring about the early defeat of Japan. Carbon copy. Annotated. Signed.

Minute from WSC to General Sir Hastings Ismay [Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence] for the Chiefs of Staff Committee marked "Secret" repeating a question from WSC to President Roosevelt and Roosevelt's reply that a British Fleet detachment was unlikely to be needed for an American operation in the Pacific before the summer of 1945. Manuscript annotations. Initialled. Flagged: "A".

Minute from WSC to General Sir Hastings Ismay [Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence] for the Chiefs of Staff Committee marked "Secret" repeating a question from WSC to President Roosevelt and Roosevelt's reply that a British Fleet detachment was unlikely to be needed for an American operation in the Pacific before the summer of 1945. Copy.

Telegram from President Roosevelt to WSC marked "Personal and Secret" stating that a British Fleet detachment is unlikely to be needed for an American operation in the Pacific before the summer of 1945. Annotated on behalf of WSC.

Map of Indian Ocean and East Indies marked "Most Secret" with Allied air reconnaissance and air strike distances, Allied ships and convoys, and estimated areas into which Japanese forces might penetrate indicated.