Statement by [Lord Kitchener] to the War Council that he had doubted whether a purely naval attack on the Dardanelles would succeed but was led to believe it was possible by WSC's statements about the power of the 'Queen Elizabeth' and the Admiralty staff paper showing how the operations were to be conducted. He did not believe that once the army was in Gallipoli the 'Queen Elizabeth' would be withdrawn and he believes that this withdrawal will have serious consequences. Typescript copy.

"Remarks by Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson on the paper and evidence of Major-General [Thomas] Hickman". Argues against Hickman's assertion that high-angle fire rather than the use of low trajectory high velocity guns would be most suitable for the bombardment of the Dardanelles forts. Printed.

Extract from the minutes of the 96th meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence on 18 February 1907 at which it was decided that an attempt to force the Dardanelles by a landing in Gallipoli would be very risky. Reprinted for the Committee on 5 September 1916.

Minute by WSC stating that the Dardanelles operations could easily develop into a great siege and calling for the following measures: the provision of siege artillery and well-equipped semi-permanent landing stages; protection against submarines; the fitting of the bombarding fleet with mine protection; the provision of seventy aircraft. Printed copy.

Minute by WSC on the despatch of howitzers and monitors to the Dardanelles and their use there. Printed copy.

Letter from WSC to Arthur Balfour [later Lord Balfour] on the measures needed to protect the Dardanelles fleet from submarine attack. Printed copy.

"Note on the transport question. Circulated to the Dardanelles Committee by the First Lord of the Admiralty [Arthur Balfour], June 18, 1915. Printed copy.

Letter from WSC to Arthur Balfour [later Lord Balfour] on the need for aircraft and 12-inch monitors in the Dardanelles. Printed copy.

Letter from WSC (72 Brook Street) to Arthur Balfour [later Lord Balfour] asking him to have produced a report on weather conditions in the Dardanelles in October, November and December and to see Commodore Roger Backhouse about the naval guns which have not yet been landed. Expresses anxiety that the sanitary conditions should be adequate for the winter campaign. Printed copy.

Dardanelles Commission of Inquiry: draft of WSC's statement on operations to the end of the first phase. Manuscript in WSC's hand and typescript. Includes: (at folio 3) letter of 23 Aug 1916 from Alexander MacCallum Scott to WSC enclosing a suggested synopsis of his main points (at folios 5-8) and advising him on how to treat the decision to abandon the naval assault.

"Dardanelles Inquiry. Statement by Mr Churchill upon the Dardanelles Operations to the end of the first phase." Printed draft with annotations by WSC.

Dardanelles Commission of Inquiry: statement by WSC on operations to the end of the first phase. Printed proof.

Dardanelles Commission of Inquiry: statement by WSC on operations to the end of the first phase. Printed proof annotated by WSC.

Dardanelles Commission of Inquiry: statement by WSC on operations to the end of the first phase. Printed proof annotated by WSC. Written 25 Sep, printed 26 Sep.

Letter from WSC to Lord Cromer correcting the impression given by part of his statement to the Dardanelles Commission of Inquiry that the Cabinet did not discuss, and were not kept informed about, the military attack. Printed copy. Another copy at CHAR 2/74/92.

Letter from Lord Kitchener (War Office) to WSC giving his opinion that nothing much can be done to help the Russians in the Caucasus and that "the only place that a demonstration might have some effect in stopping reinforcements going East would be the Dardanelles." Printed copy.

Letter from WSC (Admiralty) to Lord Kitchener arguing that only those battleships needed for the initial stage of the Dardanelles bombardment should be used at the outset and that the seizure of Alexandretta should be attempted at the same time as the bombardment so that it can be represented as the main operation if the attack on the Dardanelles is checked. Printed copy. Another copy at CHAR 2/74/52.

Letter in French from Victor Augagneur [French Minister of the Marine] (Paris) to [WSC] indicating agreement with British proposals for Angle-French naval co-operation in the eastern Mediterranean with reference to the attacks on the Dardanelles and Alexandretta (31 Jan). With notes that Sir Edward Grey [later Lord Grey of Fallodon] and Lord Kitchener have seen the letter and that WSC thinks it is satisfactory (3 Feb). Printed copy. Another copy at CHAR 2/74/56.

Letter in French from Victor Augagneur, French Minister of the Marine, to WSC agreeing with the plans for the Dardanelles operations set out in a recent memorandum from WSC and giving details of the relevant French naval dispositions. With notes that the letter was seen by [Herbert Asquith], Sir Edward Grey [later Lord Grey of Fallodon] and Lord Kitchener, and that it is satisfactory to WSC. Printed copy. Another copy at CHAR 2/74/63.

Letter from WSC to Lord Kitchener on the preparation of transports to the Dardanelles for the 29th Division and the need for the French Division to come to Lemnos in view of the absence of British regulars. Printed copy. Another copy at CHAR 2/74/59.

Letter from WSC to Lord Kitchener suggesting that 20 March be fixed on as the date for the landing of troops after the initial naval operations at the Dardanelles and approving the appointment of General Sir Ian Hamilton to the command of the military operations. Printed copy. Another copy at CHAR 2/74/60.