Second World War (1939-1945)
Found in 2737 Collections and/or Records:
(Untitled), 29 May 1942
(Untitled), 31 May 1942
Telegram from WSC to General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander-in-Chief Middle East] marked "most secret" expressing pleasure at the way the battle has gone so far, referring to the "Special Intelligence" [? Enigma decrypts] which he is sending Auchinleck, and stating that he will have to make a statement at noon on Tuesday [2 June] and requires anything publishable by 8am on that day.
(Untitled), 31 May 1942
Telegram from WSC to General Sir Archibald Wavell, Commander-in-Chief India] commenting on plans for a counter-stroke upon Japanese communications through Burma [later Myanmar] and stating that General Harold Alexander [General Officer Commanding, Burma] is needed in Britain.
(Untitled), 31 May 1942
Telegram from WSC to the Minister of State in the Middle East [Richard Casey] marked "most secret" outlining reasons why more heavy bombers cannot be sent to support the Malta convoy in June.
(Untitled), 31 May 1942
Telegram from the Minister of State in the Middle East [Richard Casey] to WSC marked "most secret" regarding the battle in Libya and stating that General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander-in-Chief Middle East] is reporting daily, and that the enemy has underestimated Allied strength and that the balance of relative casualties will be appreciably on the Allied side.
(Untitled), 01 Jun 1942
(Untitled), 12 Jun 1942
Telegram from WSC to Field Marshal Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] marked "most secret and personal" reciting the text of a telegram of 6 June from Major-General Robert Sturges [Officer commanding land forces during occupation of Madagascar] containing French counter proposals and amendments to the text of the agreement regarding Madagascar.Filed out of chronological sequence.
(Untitled), 12 Jun 1942
Telegram from WSC to Field Marshal Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] marked "most secret and personal" reciting text of telegram of 7 June from Major-General Robert Sturges [Officer commanding land forces during occupation of Madagascar] reporting on the progress of talks between Barnett and French officials in Madagascar.Filed out of chronological sequence.
(Untitled), 12 Jun 1942
Telegram from WSC to Field Marshal Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] marked "most secret and personal" reciting the text of a telegram of 7 June from Major-General Robert Sturges [Officer commanding land forces during occupation of Madagascar] reporting his observations on French proposals regarding the Madagascar agreement.Filed out of chronological sequence.
(Untitled), 12 Jun 1942
Telegram from WSC to Field Marshal Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] marked "most secret and personal" reciting the second part of a telegram of 7 June [see also CHAR 20/76/5] from Major-General Robert Sturges [Officer commanding land forces during occupation of Madagascar] regarding negotiations with the Vichy French authorities in Madagascar.Filed out of chronological sequence.
(Untitled), 01 Jun 1942
Telegram from Field Marshal Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] to WSC marked "most secret and personal" congratulating WSC on the blitz on Cologne [Germany] and commenting on the battle in Libya and the enemy submarine attack at Diego Suarez [Madagascar].
(Untitled), 01 Jun 1942
Telegram from General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander- in-Chief Middle East] and Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder [Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Mediterranean] to WSC marked "most secret" reciting the proposed text for his communique and describing fully the progress of the battle in the desert in Libya from 26 May.
(Untitled), 01 Jun 1942
(Untitled), 02 Jun 1942
Telegram from WSC to General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander-in-Chief Middle East] and Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder [Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Mediterranean] marked "most secret" stressing the vital importance of the convoys to Malta and asking them to take all steps to enable air escorts to be operated from landing grounds as far west as possible including Martubah [Libya].
(Untitled), 03 Jun 1942
(Untitled), 03 Jun 1942
Telegram from General Sir Archibald Wavell [Commander- in-Chief, India] to WSC marked "most secret" regarding the possibility of an Allied counter offensive in Burma [later Myanmar] and commenting on the problems of an early offensive.
(Untitled), 04 Jun 1942
(Untitled), 04 Jun 1942
Telegram from WSC to Field Marshal Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] reciting text of an aide memoire sent to the French Governor-General [Armand Annet] by Major-General Robert Sturges [Officer commanding land forces during occupation of Madagascar] suggesting acceptable terms of agreement.
(Untitled), 05 Jun 1942
Telegram from Field Marshal Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] to WSC expressing his grave concerns about the weakness of the air forces in South Africa and Madagascar: stresses the importance of defending the Cape and calls for more equipment and aircraft without further delay.
(Untitled), 05 Jun 1942
(Untitled), 05 Jun 1942 - 06 Jun 1942
(Untitled), 05 Jun 1942 - 06 Jun 1942
Telegram from General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander- in-Chief Middle East] and Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder [Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Mediterranean] marked "most secret" confirming that they appreciate the value of operating aircraft to support the Malta convoy from bases as far west as possible and that the necessary measures are being taken.
(Untitled), 07 Jun 1942
(Untitled), 07 Jun 1942
Telegram from the Minister of State in the Middle East [Richard Casey] to WSC marked "most secret" outlining equipment deficiencies in the Middle Eastern theatre: comments on aircraft, aircraft spares, incendiary ammunition, transport, anti-aircraft artillery, signal resources, tank ammunition, and spares for American tanks.
(Untitled), 08 Jun 1942
Telegram from General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander- in-Chief, Middle East] to WSC marked "most secret" informing him that it is difficult to get an accurate estimate of losses while the battle [in Libya] still rages, but that he hopes to send a reasonable estimate tomorrow or next day: "We know we have had heavy losses but so has the enemy and so far he has little to show for it strategically.".