Second World War (1939-1945)
Found in 2737 Collections and/or Records:
(Untitled), 12 May 1942
(Untitled), 15 May 1942
(Untitled), 15 May 1942
(Untitled), 15 May 1942
Telegram from Rear-Admiral [Edward] Neville Syfret [Commander Force "H" Sea Command] marked "most secret" discussing the feasibility of further operations in Madagascar to capture Tamatave and Majunga.
(Untitled), 15 May 1942
(Untitled), 16 May 1942
Telegram from General Sir Archibald Wavell [Commander- in-Chief India] to WSC marked "most secret" regarding the situation in India: comments on estimates for the arrival of reinforcements; assesses principal dangers for the next two months; comments on problems of railway movement; promises to telegraph separately on the defences of Ceylon [later Sri Lanka]; states that all operations will depend mainly on the strength of air force that can be provided.
(Untitled), 16 May 1942
Telegram from WSC and Chiefs of Staff to Rear-Admiral [Edward] Neville Syfret [Commander Force "H" Sea Command] [Madagascar] marked "most secret" instructing him to abandon operations for the capture of Tamatave and Majunga, to concentrate on securing Diego Suarez, and to release troops for India.
(Untitled), 17 May 1942
(Untitled), 18 May 1942
(Untitled), 19 May 1942
Telegram from WSC to Premier Joseph Stalin marked "personal and most secret" informing him that a convoy of 35 ships sailed yesterday "with orders to fight their way through to you" but warning about possible severe losses from German bombers, stating that much will depend on the Soviet ability to bomb enemy aerodromes, and suggesting that, if losses are severe, it may be necessary to hold up further convoys until the ice recedes.
(Untitled), 19 May 1942
Telegram from General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander-in- Chief Middle East] to WSC marked "most secret" outlining his intentions for the immediate future and commenting on factors affecting the date of an offensive, including the timing of the Malta convoy, possible enemy action, and relative strengths of enemy and allied forces, and concluding that "the success of a major offensive cannot be regarded as in any way certain" and asking that it be given no publicity.
(Untitled), 20 May 1942
Telegram from Richard Casey [Minister of State in the Middle East] to WSC marked "most secret" suggesting that the Malta convoy should sail from the Gibraltar end of the Mediterranean not the Alexandria [Egypt] end and outlining his reasons.
(Untitled), 20 May 1942
(Untitled), 21 May 1942
(Untitled), 21 May 1942
Telegram from General Sir Archibald Wavell, Commander- in-Chief, India, to WSC marked "most secret" stating his belief in deceiving and disturbing the enemy by false information and advocating more coherent and long term deception plans worked between London, Washington [United States] and Commanders in the field using only officers with special qualifications.
(Untitled), 22 May 1942
(Untitled), 22 May 1942
(Untitled), 26 May 1942
(Untitled), 27 May 1942
(Untitled), 27 May 1942
Telegram from General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander- in-Chief Middle East] to WSC marked "most secret" informing him that he is issuing a communique stating that a large enemy force has been engaged to the south of Bir Hacheim [Libya] and that the press are not yet being allowed to send despatches commenting on these operations.
(Untitled), 27 May 1942
(Untitled), 28 May 1942
(Untitled), 28 May 1942
(Untitled), 28 May 1942
Telegram from WSC to the President of the United States, Franklin Roosevelt, with minutes of a meeting held at 10 Downing Street at 11am on Friday 22 May between representatives of the British Government and Vyacheslav Molotov [Soviet Commissar for Foreign] and his advisers concerning the opening of a second front in Europe by Britain and the United States.
(Untitled), 28 May 1942
Telegram from Field Marshal Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] to WSC regarding the situation in Madagascar and suggesting the reduction of Tamatave and Majunga using African and South African troops.