Telegram from WSC [Marrakesh, Morocco] to the Chiefs of Staff stating that although he shares their feelings on the matter, he thinks they should order the three landing craft back to the Indian Ocean to avoid a row with the United States; detailing disputes over Pigstick [Allied advance toward Akyab, Burma, later Myanmar]; and suggesting that a "Y moon" [June date] will be chosen for Overlord [invasion of Normandy, France]. Marked: "From Sextant".

Telegram from WSC [Marrakesh, Morocco] to Secretary of State for Air [Sir Archibald Sinclair, later Lord Thurso] and Chiefs of Staff giving permission to announce Air Marshal Sir John Slessor as Commander in Chief RAF Mediterranean and Middle East and Air Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas as Air Officer Commanding Coastal Command; conveying worries about the air operations for Overlord [invasion of Normandy, France]. Marked: "From Sextant".

Telegram from WSC [Marrakesh, Morocco] to General Sir Hastings Ismay [Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence] for the Chiefs of Staff stating that he will be pleased to have the three fast LSTs [landing craft] for Shingle [Allied amphibious operations at Anzio, Italy], although they are not strictly necessary for it; and detailing how they should present these matters to the United States Chiefs of Staff. Marked: "From Sextant".

Telegram from WSC [Marrakesh, Morocco] to General Sir Hastings Ismay [Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence] for the Chiefs of Staff, Deputy Prime Minister [Clement Attlee], Foreign Secretary [Anthony Eden, later Lord Avon], and the Defence Committee giving details of plans for Shingle [Allied amphibious landings at Anzio, Italy], including the numbers of landing craft needed at different stages. Marked: "From Sextant".

Telegram from WSC [Marrakesh, Morocco] to Chiefs of Staff giving his views on proposed appointments for Overlord [invasion of Normandy, France], suggesting that Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder [Deputy Supreme Commander under General Eisenhower] should be given air command ahead of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory [Allied Air Commander for Overlord]. Marked: "From Sextant".

Telegram from WSC [Marrakesh, Morocco] to Lord Louis Mountbatten [later Lord Mountbatten of Burma, Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia] marked "Most personal, secret and private" explaining his lack of support for Buccaneer [projected Allied operation against the Andaman Islands]; questioning the military advice given to Mountbatten; and telling him to concentrate on First Culverin [attack on the Japanese-held Dutch East Indies, later Indonesia]. Marked: "From Sextant".

The War in the Pacific: Telegrams exchanged between the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister of Australia [John Curtin] and General Douglas MacArthur [Commander in Chief Philippines, Supreme Commander South West Pacific]: printed.

WSC's copy of a government paper for the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the War Cabinet marked "Most Secret" entitled "Strategy for the War against Japan" including report intended to clear up some misunderstandings in regard to the plan for the defeat of Japan; with appendices and maps. Flagged: "H".

Summary prepared for WSC by General Sir Hastings Ismay [Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence] marked "Top Secret" on the controversy about strategy for the war against Japan; referring to flagged supporting papers contained in remainder of CHAR 20/188. Signed.

Copy of a government paper marked "Most Secret" entitled "Note by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence" [WSC] on strategy for the war against Japan. Annotated: "Revised proof no. 3". Flagged: "I".

WSC's copy of a government paper for the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the War Cabinet marked "Most Secret" entitled "Overall Plan for the defeat of Japan - Communication to Dominions" including copies of minutes from General Sir Hastings Ismay [Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence] to WSC; and WSC to Ismay. Flagged: "J".

Copy of a government paper for the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the War Cabinet marked "Most Secret" entitled "Strategy for the war against Japan" including copy of minute from WSC to the Chiefs of Staff. Flagged: "K".

Copy of a preliminary note from the Minister of War Transport [Lord Leathers] to WSC on the strategic implications of shifting the British centre of gravity against Japan from Indian to Australian waters. Flagged: "L".

WSC's copy of a government paper for the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the War Cabinet marked "Most Secret" entitled "Strategy for the war against Japan" including a copy of a minute from the Chiefs of Staff to WSC replying to his minute on the subject [see CHAR 20/188A/25]. Flagged: "M".

Copy of a government paper for the Joint Planning Staff of the War Cabinet marked "Most Secret" entitled "Overall Plan for the defeat of Japan - India and Australia as bases" including report by Joint Planning Staff and annexes on Navy, Army and RAF facilities. Flagged: "M1".

Commentary for WSC by Chiefs of Staff marked "Most Secret" replying to his note on strategy for the war against Japan [CHAR 20/188A/22]. Carbon copy. Flagged: "N".

Telegram from WSC to Prime Minister of Australia [John Curtin] marked "Most Secret and Personal" suggesting the sending to Australia of small parties of administrative experts to study the potential for bases there. Flagged: "P".

Telegram from Field Marshal Sir John Dill [Representative of the British Chiefs of Staff in Washington, United States] to the Chiefs of Staff marked "Personal" passing on American Joint Staff Directive outlining a much accelerated programme for the United States advance in the Pacific. Flagged: "Q".

Minute from WSC to General Sir Hastings Ismay [Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence] for the Chiefs of Staff Committee marked "Secret" repeating a question from WSC to President Roosevelt and Roosevelt's reply that a British Fleet detachment was unlikely to be needed for an American operation in the Pacific before the summer of 1945. Copy. Flagged: "R".

Minute from General Sir Hastings Ismay [Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence] to WSC marked "Secret" stating that the opinion of President Roosevelt on the requirement for a detachment of the British Fleet in the Pacific should not be taken as final; but that the decision should be determined by the contribution which they could make to the strategy best calculated to bring about the early defeat of Japan. Flagged: "S".

Copy of government paper for the Combined Chiefs of Staff marked "Most Secret" entitled "Overall Plan for the Defeat of Japan" including a report by the Combined Staff Planners and annexes. Flagged: "A".