Letter from Lord Fisher [earlier Sir John Fisher] to Herbert Asquith [later 1st Lord Oxford and Asquith] describing certain incidents not recorded in writing which should feature in the published papers about the Dardanelles and Gallipoli operations, mentioning documents which should be included and suggesting that only a precis of his memorandum on general naval policy of January 1915 should be published. Typescript copy.

Letter from WSC (41 Cromwell Road) to Lord Cromer asking for his evidence to the Dardanelles Commission of Inquiry to be amended to make it clear that he favoured the military attack after the naval operation was abandoned and that the matter was discussed in Cabinet. Copy in WSC' s hand.

Letter from [WSC] (41 Cromwell Road) to Edward Grimwood Mears denying Sir George Arthur's assertion that Lord Kitchener was opposed to the naval attack on the Dardanelles and complaining that the propagation of this idea by members of Kitchener's entourage has led to unjust attacks in the press on WSC. Annotated typescript copy.

Statement to the Dardanelles Commission of Inquiry by Sir George Arthur that Lord Kitchener had protested against a naval attack on the Dardanelles unsupported by the army and that WSC had replied that the power of the guns of the "Queen Elizabeth" made a purely naval attack a practical proposition. Typescript copy.

Statement by [Lord Kitchener] to the War Council that he had doubted whether a purely naval attack on the Dardanelles would succeed but was led to believe it was possible by WSC's statements about the power of the 'Queen Elizabeth' and the Admiralty staff paper showing how the operations were to be conducted. He did not believe that once the army was in Gallipoli the 'Queen Elizabeth' would be withdrawn and he believes that this withdrawal will have serious consequences. Typescript copy.

"Remarks by Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson on the paper and evidence of Major-General [Thomas] Hickman". Argues against Hickman's assertion that high-angle fire rather than the use of low trajectory high velocity guns would be most suitable for the bombardment of the Dardanelles forts. Printed.

Minute by WSC stating that the Dardanelles operations could easily develop into a great siege and calling for the following measures: the provision of siege artillery and well-equipped semi-permanent landing stages; protection against submarines; the fitting of the bombarding fleet with mine protection; the provision of seventy aircraft. Printed copy.

Letter from WSC to Arthur Balfour [later Lord Balfour] on the measures needed to protect the Dardanelles fleet from submarine attack. Printed copy.

"A note by the Admiralty Transport Department. Move of the 52nd (Lowland) Division." Includes copies of documents from May 1915. Printed.

"Note on the transport question. Circulated to the Dardanelles Committee by the First Lord of the Admiralty [Arthur Balfour], June 18, 1915. Printed copy.

Letter from WSC (72 Brook Street) to Arthur Balfour [later Lord Balfour] asking him to have produced a report on weather conditions in the Dardanelles in October, November and December and to see Commodore Roger Backhouse about the naval guns which have not yet been landed. Expresses anxiety that the sanitary conditions should be adequate for the winter campaign. Printed copy.

Letter from WSC (Admiralty) to Lord Kitchener arguing that only those battleships needed for the initial stage of the Dardanelles bombardment should be used at the outset and that the seizure of Alexandretta should be attempted at the same time as the bombardment so that it can be represented as the main operation if the attack on the Dardanelles is checked. Printed copy. Another copy at CHAR 2/74/52.

Memorandum by WSC to Sir Edward Grey [later Lord Grey of Fallodon] and Lord Kitchener on the terms of naval co-operation with France in the eastern Mediterranean. With note by Grey that the French should be allowed to have what they want in this sphere, even a share in the occupation of Alexandretta. Printed copy. Another copy at CHAR 2/74/54.

Letter in French from Victor Augagneur [French Minister of the Marine] (Paris) to [WSC] indicating agreement with British proposals for Angle-French naval co-operation in the eastern Mediterranean with reference to the attacks on the Dardanelles and Alexandretta (31 Jan). With notes that Sir Edward Grey [later Lord Grey of Fallodon] and Lord Kitchener have seen the letter and that WSC thinks it is satisfactory (3 Feb). Printed copy. Another copy at CHAR 2/74/56.

Letter in French from Victor Augagneur, French Minister of the Marine, to WSC agreeing with the plans for the Dardanelles operations set out in a recent memorandum from WSC and giving details of the relevant French naval dispositions. With notes that the letter was seen by [Herbert Asquith], Sir Edward Grey [later Lord Grey of Fallodon] and Lord Kitchener, and that it is satisfactory to WSC. Printed copy. Another copy at CHAR 2/74/63.

Note by the Admiralty Transport Department on the move of the 29th Division and the 2nd Mounted Division from Avonmouth to the Mediterranean. Printed. Another copy at CHAR 2/74/58.

Minute by Admiral Sir Henry Jackson to [Vice-Admiral Henry Oliver] on the hindering of Vice-Admiral Sackville Carden's operations in the Dardanelles by concealed batteries of howitzers and the need to occupy the Gallipoli peninsula to ensure safe passage of troops through the straits (11 Mar). With note from [Lord Kitchener] to [WSC] stating that no attempt on Gallipoli should be made until the 29th Division has arrived (13 Mar), and circulation note (13 Mar). Printed copy.

Secretary's notes [minutes] of a meeting of a War Council on 28 Jan 1915 on France and Egypt, Nyassaland, East Africa, the "Konigsberg", the Press Bureau, the Zeebrugge [Belgium] Project, co-ordination of effort by the Allies, the Dardanelles, high explosives and the naval campaign. Printed for the Committee of Imperial Defence, July 1916. Sent with CHAR 2/86/1.

Letter from [WSC] to Sir William Pickford [later Lord Sterndale] arguing that the evidence taken by the Dardanelles Commission of Inquiry from Rear-Admiral Roger Keyes [later Lord Keyes] showed that there was universal agreement about the continuation of the naval attack on the straits until Rear-Admiral John de Robeck called it off in March 1915, after which the navy's offensive effectiveness was severely reduced. Typescript copy. Annotated: "not sent in".