Battle of the Atlantic (1939-1945)
Found in 153 Collections and/or Records:
(Untitled), 25 Apr 1941
Telegram from WSC to President Roosevelt thanking him for naval support in the Atlantic, referring to "Navy Western Hemisphere defence plan no. 2", and commenting on fighting in Greece and Libya.
(Untitled), 01 Aug 1940 - 01 Sep 1940
(Untitled), 03 Nov 1939
Printed paper by WSC for the War Cabinet entitled "Statement by the First Lord to the French Admiralty"; discusses the uses of "asdics" [anti-submarine detection indicator], the necessity of defeating U-boats to control the seas, and future strategy.
(Untitled), Sep 1939-May 1940
(Untitled), 06 Feb 1942
Telegram from WSC to Harry Hopkins [Special adviser and assistant to the President of the United States, Franklin Roosevelt] asking that the President's attention be drawn to the very heavy sinkings by U-boats in the Western North Atlantic: gives figures since January 12.
(Untitled), 07 Feb 1942
(Untitled), [07] [Feb] [1942]
Telegram from Harry Hopkins [Special adviser and assistant to the President of the United States, Franklin Roosevelt] to WSC: states that some moves are being made with regard to the situation in the Western North Atlantic, that shipments are getting off to the Soviet Union, and that the President is considering the Far East matter of command.
(Untitled), 20 Feb 1942
Telegram from WSC to the President of the United States [Franklin Roosevelt]: comments on the pressure and personal stress he is under; comments on the health of "Max" [1st Lord Beaverbrook, earlier Max Aitken]; states that "Democracy has to prove that it can provide a granite foundation for war against tyranny"; comments on Roosevelt's forthcoming radio broadcast regarding the flight of the German ships [the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen] from Brest [France].
(Untitled), 12 Mar 1942
Telegram from WSC to Harry Hopkins [Special adviser and assistant to the President of the United States], commenting on immense numbers of sinkings of tankers in the Caribbean and Western Atlantic and possible solutions.
(Untitled), 06 May 1942
Telegram from Premier Joseph Stalin to WSC requesting his help in escorting steamers containing important war materials from Iceland to the Soviet Union.
(Untitled), 09 May 1942
Telegram from WSC to Premier Joseph Stalin regarding convoys to the Soviet Union: outlines difficulties of sailing convoys to the Soviet Union; lists measures required from the Soviet Union to help protect convoys; states that he will be making the broadcast warning of British retaliation to German gas attacks upon Soviet Armies tomorrow.
(Untitled), 19 May 1942
Telegram from WSC to Premier Joseph Stalin marked "personal and most secret" informing him that a convoy of 35 ships sailed yesterday "with orders to fight their way through to you" but warning about possible severe losses from German bombers, stating that much will depend on the Soviet ability to bomb enemy aerodromes, and suggesting that, if losses are severe, it may be necessary to hold up further convoys until the ice recedes.
(Untitled), 28 May 1942
(Untitled), 17 Mar 1942
Telegram from the President of the United States [Franklin Roosevelt] to WSC regarding naval matters: suggests that the United States reinforce the British Home Fleet and that British ships are used to replace the HYPO Force or to do the whole escorting job [to Diego Suarez, Madagascar, in operation "Ironclad"]; states that tanker sinkings are very disturbing; comments on the role of American destroyers and trawlers in the Atlantic; suggests measures for dealing with the submarine menace.
(Untitled), 18 Mar 1942
Telegram from the President of the United States, Franklin Roosevelt, to WSC outlining details of the United States naval force assigned to report for temporary duty with the British Home Fleet; states that a similar detachment will be kept on "this side" to "head off enemy when he comes into open Atlantic.".
(Untitled), 17 Apr 1942
Telegram from the President of the United States [Franklin Roosevelt] to Harry Hopkins [Special adviser and assistant to President Roosevelt] for WSC concerning shipping and the decision to lay up all tankers operating on the Atlantic Coast.
(Untitled), 25 Apr 1942
Telegram from Harry Hopkins [Special adviser and assistant to the President of the United States] to WSC regarding accumulations of shipping for the Soviet Union and asking if more ships can be carried in the next convoys in order to clear this up.
(Untitled), 27 Apr 1942
(Untitled), 28 Apr 1942
Telegram from WSC to the President of the United States [Franklin Roosevelt] regarding shipments of supplies to the Soviet Union: comments on logistics of convoy sizes and tonnage; makes a recommendation for working off the present accumulation held in Iceland; "We are at our utmost strain for convoy escorts.".
(Untitled), 30 Apr 1942
(Untitled), 02 May 1942
(Untitled), 03 May 1942
Telegram from the President of the United States, Franklin Roosevelt, to WSC agreeing to acquiesce to British views regarding Soviet convoys; hopes that Britain will be able to keep convoys at a strength of thirty five ships and proposes to press the Soviet Union to reduce requirements as "Bolero" [codename for preparations for the main invasion of France] will require all possible munitions and shipping.
(Untitled), 07 Jul 1942
Telegram from Harry Hopkins [Special Adviser and Assistant to the President of the United States] to WSC informing him that no decision has yet been made as to the change of policy relative to American shipping losses but that the matter is now under discussion.
(Untitled), 10 Jul 1942
Telegram from President Roosevelt to WSC listing naval vessels built or being built in Canada that would be suitable for combatting enemy submarines and mining operations and asking if they can be temporarily assigned to the United States.
(Untitled), 14 Jul 1942
Telegram from WSC to President Roosevelt marked "personal and secret" regarding the northern shipping convoys to the Soviet Union: reports on the heavy losses sustained by PQ 17 [June convoy]; advises against running PQ 18 [July convoy]; comments on the future prospects of supplying Russia by this northern route; states that allied shipping losses for week ending July 13 were 400,000 tons, " a rate unexampled in either this war or the last".