Scope and Contents Telegram from WSC to General Sir Archibald Wavell, Commander-in-Chief India, marked "most secret" outlining objectives for the war in the Far East: comments on the transfer of troops from Madagascar; comments on plans to assemble the whole Eastern Fleet at Colombo [Ceylon, later Sri Lanka] and Port Trincomalee [Ceylon, later Sri Lanka] before the middle of July and to recover effective control of the Bay of Bengal [Indian Ocean]; suggests that these dispositions will facilitate offensive...

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Telegram from Rear-Admiral [Edward] Neville Syfret [Commander Force "H" Sea Command] marked "most secret" discussing the feasibility of further operations in Madagascar to capture Tamatave and Majunga.

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Telegram from General Sir Archibald Wavell [Commander- in-Chief India] to WSC marked "most secret" regarding the situation in India: comments on estimates for the arrival of reinforcements; assesses principal dangers for the next two months; comments on problems of railway movement; promises to telegraph separately on the defences of Ceylon [later Sri Lanka]; states that all operations will depend mainly on the strength of air force that can be provided.

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Telegram from WSC and Chiefs of Staff to Rear-Admiral [Edward] Neville Syfret [Commander Force "H" Sea Command] [Madagascar] marked "most secret" instructing him to abandon operations for the capture of Tamatave and Majunga, to concentrate on securing Diego Suarez, and to release troops for India.

Scope and Contents Telegram from WSC to Field Marshal Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] marked "most secret" regarding the situation in Madagascar and reciting a telegram from WSC and Chiefs of Staff to Rear-Admiral [Edward] Neville Syfret [see CHAR 20/75/45]: comments on the reasons for delaying the occupation of Tamatave and Majunga; proposes a "modus vivendi" with the Vichy French; suggests that 4th Lord Harlech [earlier William Ormsby-Gore, High Commissioner for Britain in South Africa] visit...

Scope and Contents Telegram from General Sir Archibald Wavell [Commander- in-Chief India] to WSC marked "most secret" reporting on the latest situation in Burma [later Myanmar] and north east India: comments on the movements and "excellent health and spirits" of General Harold Alexander [General Officer Commanding Burma]; states that the troops from Burma have been collected in the Imphal area [India] and comments on their numbers and morale; reports that there has been no news of whereabouts of...

Scope and Contents Telegram from WSC to General Sir Archibald Wavell [Commander-in-Chief India] marked "most secret": states that Wavell can keep General Harold Alexander [General Officer Commanding, Burma, later Myanmar] while he writes his report; comments on losses of the United States and Japan in Coral Sea action; states that the Admiralty believe the main Japanese fleet to be at Truk and that Japanese operations against Midway Island are certain, against Aleutian Islands are very probable, and against...

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Telegram from General Sir Archibald Wavell, Commander- in-Chief, India, to WSC marked "most secret" stating his belief in deceiving and disturbing the enemy by false information and advocating more coherent and long term deception plans worked between London, Washington [United States] and Commanders in the field using only officers with special qualifications.

Scope and Contents Telegram from General Sir Archibald Wavell [Commander- in-Chief, India] to WSC reporting on the withdrawal of troops from Burma [later Myanmar]: states that he has seen General Harold Alexander [General Officer Commanding, Burma], is flying to Dinjan [? India] where he hopes to meet Lieutenant-General Joseph Stilwell [Commander of United States forces in China, India and Burma, and Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang-Kai-shek], and will then go to Imphal [India] to see troops from Burma;...

Scope and Contents Telegram from Field Marshal Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] to WSC marked "most secret and personal" reporting his conclusions on general strategy based upon his visit to the Middle East: comments on the situation in Libya and states that he considers "conclusive operations in Libyan bulge essential for our real victory"; comments on the importance of holding a Middle East block, including Iran, Iraq, India, Ceylon [later Sri Lanka] and the Indian Ocean, from both German and...

Scope and Contents Telegram from WSC to the President of the United States [Franklin Roosevelt] marked "personal and secret": reports on the signing of a treaty [of alliance between Britain and the Soviet Union]; comments on Vyacheslav Molotov [Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs] and asks for Roosevelt's impressions; states that all has gone well with the Northern convoy but that the next two days will be serious; comments on talks with General Henry Arnold [Chief of United States Army Air Force] and Towers...

Scope and Contents Telegram from WSC to Field Marshal Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] marked "personal and most secret" commenting on his recommendations regarding strategy: comments on British naval, land and air reinforcements for India; states that he believes the Japanese will strike north against Chiang-Kai-shek [Chinese Nationalist leader] and comments on the possibility of striking eastward at the Japanese through Burma [later Myanmar]; states that it will be difficult to meet a really heavy...

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Telegram from WSC to Field Marshal Sir John Dill [Head of British Joint Staff Mission, Washington, United States] suggesting alterations to an Allied document on war strategy: suggests "essentials" should be an assumption of an offensive against Japan, an air offensive against Germany to relieve the Soviet Union, and British mastery of the Indian Ocean.

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Telegram from the President of the United States, Franklin Roosevelt, to WSC regarding the concerns of Generalissimo Chiang-Kai-shek [Chinese nationalist leader] over the military command in Burma and Southern China: suggests that Lieutenant-General Joseph Stilwell [Commander of United States Forces in China, Burma (later Myanmar) and India] command the northern end, with the southern part coming under British command.

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Telegram from WSC to the Prime Minister of New Zealand [Peter Fraser] commenting on troop and naval reinforcements for the Far East and expressing doubts about the likelihood of a Japanese invasion of Australia or New Zealand.

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Telegram from the Prime Minister of New Zealand [Peter Fraser] to WSC disputing his view that a serious invasion of New Zealand or Australia is unlikely and renewing representations that their position be strengthened.

Scope and Contents Telegram from WSC to the President of the United States [Franklin Roosevelt]: states that he has not yet heard from Australia and New Zealand but that in principle there are great merits resulting from the United States controlling the Pacific sphere and Britain controlling the Indian sphere; comments on the need for the American and British navies to work to a common strategy; describes British naval force in the Central Indian Ocean; comments on the need to co-ordinate all naval commands...

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Telegram from WSC to John Curtin [Prime Minister of Australia] regarding proposals by the President of the United States [Franklin Roosevelt] for dividing the commands [into United States Pacific and British Indian spheres] and stating that this will not absolve Britain from a duty to aid Australia in the event of an invasion. Annotation indicates that the telegram was also sent to Peter Fraser [Prime Minister of New Zealand].

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Telegram from the President of the United States, Franklin Roosevelt, to WSC regarding the arrival of General Douglas MacArthur in Australia, his appointment as Supreme Commander in the [South West Pacific] area and the resulting press release.

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Telegram from John Curtin, Prime Minister of Australia, to WSC reciting text of a message to the President of the United States [Franklin Roosevelt] nominating General Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces "in this theatre" [South West Pacific], and asking to be informed of the timing and text of any announcement.

Scope and Contents Telegram from WSC to the President of the United States [Franklin Roosevelt] opposing the creation of a separate military command in Burma [later Myanmar] under Lieutenant-General Joseph Stilwell [Commander of United States forces in China, Burma and India]: encloses text of a telegram from General Harold Alexander [General Officer Commanding, Burma] regarding problems arising from Stilwell's arrival; suggests that Stilwell be under the general directions of Alexander in respect of troops...

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Telegram from WSC to the President of the United States [Franklin Roosevelt] commenting on a message from Admiral Ernest King [Chief of Naval Operations and Commander-in- Chief, United States Navy] promising to keep the Japanese occupied in the Pacific while Britain is building up strength in the Indian Ocean; also refusing Roosevelt's "generous offer" of two new battleships [to reinforce the British Home Fleet].

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Telegram from the President of the United States [Franklin Roosevelt to WSC describing damage inflicted by United States forces on the Japanese naval task force off New Guinea [later Papua New Guinea and part of Indonesia]: "It was by all means the best days work we have had.".

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Telegram from the Prime Minister of New Zealand [Peter Fraser] to WSC accepting proposals by WSC and the President of the United States, Franklin Roosevelt, for the establishment of unified control for the conduct of the war in the Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Atlantic, and welcoming the appointment of General Douglas MacArthur as [Commander-in-Chief of Allied forces, South West Pacific area]; hopes that the close collaboration between Australia and New Zealand will not be weakened.

Scope and Contents Telegram from the Prime Minister of Australia [John Curtin] regarding the aircraft position in Australia: comments on his representations to the President of the United States [Franklin Roosevelt] regarding the need for a United States - Australian Air Staff and Planning Staff, and the willingness of Australia to place its Air Force under the immediate control of Lieutenant-General George Brett [Commander of Allied Air Forces, Dutch East Indies, later Indonesia]; states that President...