"The Dardanelles Inquiry. Notes for evidence by Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Maurice Hankey, secretary, Committee of Imperial Defence." Uncorrected proof annotated by WSC. Printed 16 Aug. Sent with CHAR 2/74/47-48.

Letter from WSC (Admiralty) to Lord Kitchener arguing that only those battleships needed for the initial stage of the Dardanelles bombardment should be used at the outset and that the seizure of Alexandretta should be attempted at the same time as the bombardment so that it can be represented as the main operation if the attack on the Dardanelles is checked. Printed copy. Another copy at CHAR 2/81/9,.

Letter in French from Victor Augagneur [French Minister of Marine] (Paris) to [WSC] indicating agreement with British proposals for Anglo-French naval co-operation in the eastern Mediterranean with reference to the attacks on the Dardanelles and Alexandretta (31 Jan). With notes that Sir Edward Grey [later Lord Grey of Fallodon] and Lord Kitchener have seen the letter and that WSC thinks it is satisfactory (3 February). Printed copy. Another copy at CHAR 2/81/13.

Letter from WSC to Lord Kitchener on the preparation of transports to the Dardanelles for the 29th Division and the need for the French Division to come to Lemnos in view of the absence of British regulars. Printed copy. Another copy at CHAR 2/81/17.

Letter from WSC to Lord Kitchener suggesting that 20 March be fixed on as the date for the landing of troops after the initial naval operations at the Dardanelles and approving the appointment of General Sir Ian Hamilton to the command of the military operations. Printed copy. Another copy at CHAR 2/81/18.

Letter in French from Victor Augagneur, French Minister of Marine, to WSC agreeing with the plans for the Dardanelles operations set out in a recent memorandum from WSC and giving details of the relevant French naval dispositions. With notes that the letter was seen by [Herbert Asquith, later 1st Lord Oxford and Asquith], Sir Edward Grey [later Lord Grey of Fallodon] and Lord Kitchener, and that it is satisfactory to WSC. Printed copy. Another copy at CHAR 2/81/14.

Letter from J L Garvin (9 Greville Place, [London]) to WSC on the amendments made by [Lord Fisher, earlier Sir John Fisher] to the evidence he proposes to present to the Dardanelles Commission of Inquiry and Fisher's continued belief that it is still possible to carry out a naval action in the Baltic and an attack on the Dardanelles as outlined by Fisher in his letter to WSC of 3 January 1915.

"Lord Fisher's narrative of his connection with the Dardanelles Operations." [Lord Fisher, earlier Sir John Fisher]. Typescript.

Letter from Lord Fisher [earlier Sir John Fisher] to Herbert Asquith [later 1st Lord Oxford and Asquith] describing certain incidents not recorded in writing which should feature in the published papers about the Dardanelles and Gallipoli operations, mentioning documents which should be included and suggesting that only a precis of his memorandum on general naval policy of January 1915 should be published. Typescript copy.

Letter from WSC (41 Cromwell Road) to Lord Cromer asking for his evidence to the Dardanelles Commission of Inquiry to be amended to make it clear that he favoured the military attack after the naval operation was abandoned and that the matter was discussed in Cabinet. Copy in WSC' s hand.

Letter from WSC to Lord Cromer correcting the impression given by part of his statement to the Dardanelles Commission of Inquiry that the Cabinet did not discuss, and were not kept informed about, the military attack. Printed copy. Another copy at CHAR 2/81/6.

Letter from [WSC] (41 Cromwell Road) to Edward Grimwood Mears denying Sir George Arthur's assertion that Lord Kitchener was opposed to the naval attack on the Dardanelles and complaining that the propagation of this idea by members of Kitchener's entourage has led to unjust attacks in the press on WSC. Annotated typescript copy.

Statement to the Dardanelles Commission of Inquiry by Sir George Arthur that Lord Kitchener had protested against a naval attack on the Dardanelles unsupported by the army and that WSC had replied that the power of the guns of the "Queen Elizabeth" made a purely naval attack a practical proposition. Typescript copy.

Statement by [Lord Kitchener] to the War Council that he had doubted whether a purely naval attack on the Dardanelles would succeed but was led to believe it was possible by WSC's statements about the power of the 'Queen Elizabeth' and the Admiralty staff paper showing how the operations were to be conducted. He did not believe that once the army was in Gallipoli the 'Queen Elizabeth' would be withdrawn and he believes that this withdrawal will have serious consequences. Typescript copy.

"Remarks by Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson on the paper and evidence of Major-General [Thomas] Hickman". Argues against Hickman's assertion that high-angle fire rather than the use of low trajectory high velocity guns would be most suitable for the bombardment of the Dardanelles forts. Printed.

Extract from the minutes of the 96th meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence on 18 February 1907 at which it was decided that an attempt to force the Dardanelles by a landing in Gallipoli would be very risky. Reprinted for the Committee on 5 September 1916.

Minute by WSC stating that the Dardanelles operations could easily develop into a great siege and calling for the following measures: the provision of siege artillery and well-equipped semi-permanent landing stages; protection against submarines; the fitting of the bombarding fleet with mine protection; the provision of seventy aircraft. Printed copy.

Minute by WSC on the despatch of howitzers and monitors to the Dardanelles and their use there. Printed copy.

Letter from WSC to Arthur Balfour [later Lord Balfour] on the measures needed to protect the Dardanelles fleet from submarine attack. Printed copy.