Dardanelles campaign (1915-1916)
Found in 225 Collections and/or Records:
(Untitled), 02 Apr 1915
Telegram from Vice-Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles to Admiralty, on preparations for landing the Army, which would require two Captains, 3 Commanders, 27 Lieutenants, 24 Warrant and Subordinate Officers and 700 men [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 03 Apr 1915
Telegram from Vice-Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles to WSC, First Lord of the Admiralty, on plan for combined attack on the Narrows [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 03 Apr 1915
Telegram from Vice-Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles to Admiralty, report in minesweeping operations inside the Straits [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 03 Apr 1915
Telegram from Vice-Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles to Admiralty, on collaboration with the Russian Fleet so that Russian attack on the Bosphorus [Karadeniz Bogazi, Turkey] should synchronize with British attack on the Dardanelles. [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 03 Apr 1915
Telegram from WSC, First Lord of the Admiralty to Vice-Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles, asking for full report after meeting with General Sir Ian Hamilton. Stating that his special cipher "B" was absolutely secret and h could dismiss all ideas of leakage. Ordering him not to discuss WSC's "personal and secret" telegrams with anyone except his Chief of Staff, and General Hamilton [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 03 Apr 1915
Telegram from Vice-Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles, to Admiralty, requesting that the 3 Monitors arrive at Mudros by 12 Apr [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 04 Apr 1915
Telegram from Vice-Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles, to Admiralty, report on plans for landing troops, and on minesweeping operations in the Narrows [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 04 Apr 1915
Telegram from Vice-Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles, to Admiralty, on exchange of telegrams with the Russian Admiral Aberhardt [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 06 Apr 1915
Telegram from WSC, First Lord of the Admiralty to Vice-Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles, asking for details of protection of ships against mines. Also asking if he had considered use of smoke screens to cover landings, and if the lack of water on the Gallipoli Peninsula would restrict the numbers of the Turkish garrison [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 08 Apr 1915
(Untitled), 10 Apr 1915
Telegram from Vice-Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles, to Admiralty, report on operations on 8 Apr [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 10 Apr 1915
Telegram from Vice-Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles, to WSC, First Lord of the Admiralty, report of work of the Naval Air Service, praising the work of Commander Charles Samson, and requesting that more aircraft be sent out [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 11 Apr 1915
Telegram from Vice-Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles, to WSC, First Lord of the Admiralty, reporting arrival of General Sir Ian Hamilton. Giving details of Hamilton's plan of operations, with the main landing at Cape Helles, supported by feints and diversions [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 12 Apr 1915
Telegram from Admiralty to Vice-Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles, reporting that the Germans were trying to arrange for a considerable quantity of fuel oil and lubricating oil to be sent from Constantinople [Istanbul] to Budrum, possibly for submarines [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 13 Apr 1915
Telegram from Vice-Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles, to Admiralty, reporting that HMS "Agamemnon" had shelled various positions on the Northern and Southern shores of the Gulf of Xeres; that air reconnaissance had reported no movement of troops in the southern area of the Gallipoli Peninsula, and that the Army was practicing rapid landings on the beach at Mudros [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 14 Apr 1915
Telegram from Vice-Admiral John De Robeck, Mudros, to Admiralty, reporting that the Captains of the "E" Class submarines had reconnoitered the Dardanelles in destroyers and aircraft, and would two or three days before the main attack they would undertake the passage of the Straits with a view to operating off Gallipoli town and cutting Turkish sea communications [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 09 Nov 1920
Letter from [WSC] to Walter Long [later Lord Long] asserting that the conclusions of the report on the Dardanelles will encourage a negative attitude in the Navy and that if it is published so should all other relevant documents. Typescript copy.
(Untitled), 15 Nov 1920
Letter from Walter Long [later Lord Long] (Admiralty) to WSC stating that he intends to leave the consideration of the report [on the Dardanelles defences] to his Naval Staff and does not intend to publish it.
(Untitled), 14 Oct 1915
Page from the Times including marked article describing the naval attack in the Dardanelles as "a legitimate war gamble". [Retained in connection with the proceedings against Lord Alfred Douglas arising from his claim that WSC misreported the Battle of Jutland to allow Jewish interests led by Sir Ernest Cassel to profit on the stock market].
(Untitled), 06 Dec 1925
Letter from Sir Roger Keyes [later Lord Keyes] (Admiralty House, Malta) to WSC thanking him for writing, reporting on his inspection of aircraft carriers and his cruise in the Aegean, referring to Cecil Aspinall's [later Cecil Aspinall-Oglander] history of the [Dardanelles] campaign and to his (Keyes') polo ponies.
(Untitled), 23 Aug 1916
Letter from General Sir Ian Hamilton (Deanston House, Perthshire, [Scotland]) to WSC enclosing a copy of a telegram from him to Rear Admiral John de Robeck [see CHAR 2/74/2] to show that he did not influence de Robeck in his abandonment of purely naval attacks at the Dardanelles. Signed typescript.
(Untitled), 15 Jan 1915
Minute by WSC on the plan for concentrating naval forces in the Mediterranean ("Pola") with a view to forcing the Dardanelles. Typescript copy.
(Untitled), 20 Jan 1915
Minute by WSC on the naval arrangements for the forcing of the Dardanelles and the seizure of Alexandretta. Typescript copy.
(Untitled), 16 Jan 1915 - 18 Jan 1915
(Untitled), 20 Jan 1915
Letter from WSC (Admiralty) to Lord Kitchener arguing that only those battleships needed for the initial stage of the Dardanelles bombardment should be used at the outset and that the seizure of Alexandretta should be attempted at the same time as the bombardment so that it can be represented as the main operation if the attack on the Dardanelles is checked. Printed copy. Another copy at CHAR 2/81/9,.