Statistics on changes in military and naval expenditure in Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary and Japan, 1904-1913. [Carbon].

Statistics on changes on military and naval expenditure in Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary and Japan, 1904-1913. [Carbon].

Minute from WSC, (Admiralty Yacht [Enchantress]), to Sir Edward Grey, [Foreign Secretary] and the Prime Minister [Herbert Asquith, later 1st Lord Oxford and Asquith], on naval policy in the Mediterranean, particularly regarding France. [Hand-written, initialled by WSC, Asquith and Grey, with typed transcript].

Minute from WSC, to Sir Edward Grey, [Foreign Secretary] and Herbert Asquith, Prime Minister [later 1st Lord Oxford and Asquith], on naval policy with France in the Mediterranean. [Typed transcript].

Telegram from WSC to Field Marshal Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] marked "most secret and personal" reciting the text of a telegram of 6 June from Major-General Robert Sturges [Officer commanding land forces during occupation of Madagascar] containing French counter proposals and amendments to the text of the agreement regarding Madagascar.Filed out of chronological sequence.

Telegram from WSC to Field Marshal Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] marked "most secret and personal" reciting text of telegram of 7 June from Major-General Robert Sturges [Officer commanding land forces during occupation of Madagascar] reporting on the progress of talks between Barnett and French officials in Madagascar.Filed out of chronological sequence.

Telegram from WSC to Field Marshal Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] marked "most secret and personal" reciting the text of a telegram of 7 June from Major-General Robert Sturges [Officer commanding land forces during occupation of Madagascar] reporting his observations on French proposals regarding the Madagascar agreement.Filed out of chronological sequence.

Telegram from WSC to Field Marshal Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] marked "most secret and personal" reciting the second part of a telegram of 7 June [see also CHAR 20/76/5] from Major-General Robert Sturges [Officer commanding land forces during occupation of Madagascar] regarding negotiations with the Vichy French authorities in Madagascar.Filed out of chronological sequence.

Telegram from Field Marshal Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] to WSC marked "most secret and personal" congratulating WSC on the blitz on Cologne [Germany] and commenting on the battle in Libya and the enemy submarine attack at Diego Suarez [Madagascar].

Telegram from WSC to Field Marshal Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] reciting text of an aide memoire sent to the French Governor-General [Armand Annet] by Major-General Robert Sturges [Officer commanding land forces during occupation of Madagascar] suggesting acceptable terms of agreement.

Telegram from the High Commissioner for Britain in South Africa [4th Lord Harlech, earlier William Ormsby-Gore] to WSC marked "most secret and personal" informing WSC of the grave apprehension of Field Marshal Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] that information about allied forces in Diego Suarez [Madagascar] and the Mozambique Channel will reach the enemy if Armand Annet [Vichy French Governor-General of Madagascar] is allowed to continue communicating freely with Vichy France.

Telegram from Minister of State in the Middle East [Richard Casey] to WSC marked "personal and most secret" regarding the French fleet in Alexandria [Egypt] and arguing that there would be no point in denouncing the agreement with the French Admiral as this might lead to a battle between the British and French fleets at the same time as the battle is proceeding at El Alamein [Egypt].

Telegram from WSC to President Roosevelt marked "personal and secret" regarding the French fleeet in Alexandria [Egypt]: states that French ships must be made to obey the orders of the British Naval Commander in Chief [ Admiral Henry Harwood] if and when he orders them through the Suez Canal; agrees that they will be offered protective custody of the United States on emerging from the Canal; confirms that action will not be taken until the land battle has been lost.

Telegram from WSC to President Roosevelt marked "personal and secret" welcoming his proposal that the French warships at Alexandria [Egypt] be allowed to proceed to Martinique by way of the Suez Canal: suggests additions to the proposed offer and denies that the warships are in any way within the scope of the Armistice Agreement.

Telegram from WSC to Minister of State in the Middle East [Richard Casey] marked "most secret and personal" regarding the fate of the French warships at Alexandria [Egypt]: states that he is sending Casey the texts of telegrams exchanged between himself and President Roosevelt [see CHAR 20/77/109-110]; states that Casey must explain to Admiral Henry Harwood [Commander in Chief Mediterranean] that the ships must not be allowed to sail for Bizerta [Tunisia].

Telegram from WSC to Minister of State in the Middle East [Richard Casey] marked "most secret and personal" reciting texts of telegrams from President Roosevelt to WSC and from WSC to President Roosevelt regarding the French warships at Alexandria [Egypt].See CHAR 20/77/108 for accompanying telegram from WSC to Casey.

Telegram from General Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] to WSC marked "most secret and personal" regarding the position of the French warships at Alexandria [Egypt], commenting on the implications of threat by Pierre Laval [Head of the government, Vichy France] to declare war if the ships are tampered with, and urging that the ships are only sunk as a last resort.

Telegram from WSC to President Roosevelt marked "most secret and personal" stating his belief that the danger of offensive action by the French fleet would be reduced by the presence of United States warships in the Mediterranean, and suggesting the temporary attachment for four or five days of four American destroyers to British naval units, to be replaced in the American Atlantic flotilla by a corresponding number of British destroyers.