Armed forces
Found in 991 Collections and/or Records:
(Untitled), 08 Apr 1941
Letter from WSC to the United States Ambassador to Britain [John Winant] thanking him for his letter on diplomatic arrangements surrounding the leasing of air bases on British territory in Newfoundland [later part of Canada], Bermuda and Trinidad to the United States.
(Untitled), 08 Feb 1919
Copy of a letter from WSC to [Walter] Long [later Lord Long, First Lord of the Admiralty] marked "most secret" on subjects including: his intentions toward the Royal Air Force and the Army; the independence of the Air Force and Air Ministry; proposals to enhance the the character of the air force with unique ranks and titles; organisation of the Air Council and proposed appointments.Carbon typescript signed with initials.
(Untitled), 31 Aug 1920
(Untitled), 01 Sep 1922
(Untitled), 12 Dec 1924
Copy of a letter from WSC to Sir Samuel Hoare [later Lord Templewood], Secretary of State for Air marked "private and personal" on the defence of Singapore, suggesting the use of air power instead of submarines.Unsigned carbon typescript.
(Untitled), 23 Apr 1915
Minute from WSC, First Lord of the Admiralty to Lord Fisher, 1st Sea Lord, suggesting that 20 Midshipmen be transferred to the Naval Air Service "we have drowned 50 doing nothing, and this is a splendid education [handwritten, initialled by WSC, annotated "Concur" by Fisher"].
(Untitled), 23 Apr 1915
Minute by WSC, First Lord of the Admiralty on German use of "asphyxiating shells" asking for details of masks supplied to the fleet, suggesting that something very simple was required which could be made easily and in large quantities, with replied by various Admiralty Departments.
(Untitled), 24 Apr 1915
Minute by Rear-Admiral Morgan Singer, Director of Naval Ordnance to WSC, First Lord of the Admiralty on supply of respirators to the fleet.
(Untitled), 24 Apr 1915
Minute by Sir Arthur May, Medical Diector-General, Admiralty, on respirators supplied to the Fleet.
(Untitled), 03 Nov 1910
Letter from Richard Haldane [later Lord Haldane] (War Office) to WSC reporting that he is going to Aldershot [Hampshire] to examine the airship construction department there, and that he does not think the Government can usefully intervene in the deveopment of [Louis Brennan's] monorail system. States that he is ready to take up WSC's plan of a police territorial brigade.
(Untitled), 18 Dec 1911
Letter from ? Wright (Head Quarters, Ottoman Army, Dehibat [Tunisia] via Nallent, Tripoli, [Libya]) to WSC describing: the excellence and toughness of Arab and Turkish soldiers; the great value of aircraft for reconnaisance; the massacre committed by the Italians.
(Untitled), 15 Dec 1941
Telegram from General Sir Archibald Wavell [Commander- in-Chief, India and Burma] to WSC on need for more aeroplanes in India and crew for Burma [later Myanmar]; International Air Force based in Burma should be placed under Wavell's control.
(Untitled), 07 Aug 1941
Telegram from Prime Minister of Australia [Robert Menzies] to WSC asking for projected German moves around Turkey and Libya; also on the failure to provide anticipated strength bomber and fighter squadrons.
(Untitled), 28 Aug 1941
Telegram from WSC to Stalin on subjects including: the provision of fighter aircraft, Tomahawks and Hurricanes; Persian [Iranian] resistance has ended enabling development of railway for supplies; Anglo-Soviet resistance to Japan.
(Untitled), 25 Oct 1941
Telegram from Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder [Air Officer Commanding in Chief, Middle East] to WSC expressing confidence in assisting the army offensive.
(Untitled), 25 Oct 1941
Telegram from WSC to the Minister of State, Middle East [Oliver Lyttelton, later 1st Lord Chandos] for Commanders-in- Chief Committee Middle East advising against relying on German engagement in the Soviet Union; feels Whipcord [codename for a British plan for the invasion of Sicily] should proceed immediately relying on superiority of Allied air power, to link up with Mediterranean; Germany will be threatened in Europe and provoke resistance by Spain.
(Untitled), 21 Nov 1941
Telegram from Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder [Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Middle East] to WSC: battle report; mentions Tobruk, Derna, Bardia [Libya], Malta and Benghazi.
(Untitled), 29 Sep 1941
Telegram from 1st Lord Beaverbrook [Minister of Supply, British Supply Mission to the Soviet Union, earlier Max Aitken] to WSC on non-arrival in the Soviet Union of promised aircraft.
(Untitled), 30 Sep 1941
Telegram from 1st Lord Beaverbrook [Minister of Supply, British Supply Mission to the Soviet Union, earlier Max Aitken] to WSC: Stalin no longer wants Spitfires, instead requires Tomahawks and Hurricanes.
(Untitled), 01 Oct 1941
Telegram from WSC to 1st Lord Beaverbrook [Minister of Supply, British Supply Mission to the Soviet Union, earlier Max Aitken] agreeing to increased order of Hurricanes and Tomahawks for the Soviet Union.
(Untitled), 31 Dec 1941
Telegram from General Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander-in- Chief, Middle East, to WSC on subjects including a tank encounter to the south of Agedabia [Ajdabiyah, Libya], the accuracy of RAF bombing and the movement of enemy ships from Ras el Aali.
(Untitled), 02 Jan 1942
Telegrams from General Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander- in-Chief, Middle East, to WSC on subjects including: activity in Agedabia [Ajdabiyah, Libya]; RAF bombing of Ras Aali; prisoner-of-war figures; fighter planes over Agedabia; news from Lieutenant-General Neil Ritchie [Commander of 8th Army] on the Allied capture of Bardia, and release of British prisoners-of-war.
(Untitled), 14 Jan 1942
Telegram from WSC to the Prime Minister of Australia [John Curtin] with figures for army and air reinforcement of Malaya [later Malaysia].
(Untitled), 14 Jan 1942
Telegram from WSC to the Government of New Zealand [and Peter Fraser, Prime Minister] with figures for air reinforcement of New Zealand.
(Untitled), 24 Jan 1942
Telegram from Commanders in Chief (Middle East) to WSC giving details of German and Allied army strengths at the beginning of "Crusader" [codename for British North African operation], including details of losses on both sides and reasons for Allied success.