Telegram from Middle East Defence Committee to WSC outlining strategy: states that if the German attack materialises "our only course will be to fall back on defences in rear in Persia [later Iran], Central Iraq and South Syria", which will mean abandoning all air bases north of this line, and abandoning all idea of supporting the Turks; "Everything of course depends on speed and volume with which deficiencies can be made good".

Telegram from WSC to Field-Marshal Sir John Dill [Head of British Joint Staff Mission to Washington, United States] explaining that he is awaiting the reaction of Australia and New Zealand before reaching a conclusion in the British Cabinet regarding the direction of the war in the Far East.

Telegram from WSC to the Prime Minister of Australia [John Curtin]: quotes a telegram from the President of the United States [Franklin Roosevelt] regarding the political and military representation of Australia, New Zealand and Dutch East Indies [later Indonesia] [see CHAR 20/69B/79-80], and asks for comments.

Telegram from WSC to General Sir Archibald Wavell [Supreme Commander, South West Pacific] asking him to explain his decision to order Hurricanes from Singapore to Palembang [Sumatra, Dutch East Indies, later Indonesia].

Telegram from General Sir Archibald Wavell [Supreme Commander, South West Pacific] to WSC explaining his decision to withdraw fighter planes from Singapore to Sumatra [Dutch East Indies, later Indonesia]: argues that withdrawal of troops into Singapore had exposed 3 out of 4 aerodromes to artillery fire, and that to leave fighters on exposed aerodromes would be to invite their destruction; considers that there is "every intention and hope of holding" Singapore.

Telegram from WSC to the Prime Minister of New Zealand [Peter Fraser]: quotes telegram from the President of the United States [Franklin Roosevelt] regarding political and military representation of Australia, New Zealand and the Dutch East Indies [later Indonesia] [see CHAR 20/69B/79-80], and asks for comments.

Telegram from General Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander- in-Chief, Middle East, to WSC regarding the latest position in North Africa: describes troop positions; states that the immediate intention is to stabilise on a general line of present positions while retaining control of No Man's Land; believes that the tank situation is favourable and that the enemy is at the end of a long line of communications; is preparing a defensive position on a general line Sollum-Giarabub [Libya].

Telegram from Minister of State, Middle East [Oliver Lyttelton, later 1st Lord Chandos] to WSC: states that he has been having a "very sticky time" with the Egyptian political crisis and the need to restore the temporarily shaken confidence of the military; believes that there has been no major lapse in preparations for the battle.

Telegram from WSC to General Sir Archibald Wavell [Supreme Commander, South West Pacific] regarding the fighter defence of Singapore: feels it is a disadvantage that the fighter force should have to waste time flying between Sumatra [Dutch East Indies, later Indonesia] and Singapore; hopes to send 90 more Hurricanes before the end of February.

Telegram from the Prime Minister of Australia, John Curtin, to WSC rejecting the decision by the Chiefs of Staff to have separate Indian and Pacific fleets to face the superior Japanese fleet.

Telegrams from General Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander- in-Chief, Middle East, to WSC on subjects including: enemy movement around Agedabia [Ajdabiyah, Libya]; prisoner- of-war figures and a damage report following surrender of Bardia; success at Bardia due to tanks and South African infantry, the RAF and the Australian and Free French air forces.

Telegram from WSC to the Minister of State, Middle East [Oliver Lyttelton, later 1st Lord Chandos] on his proposals for Allied landings on Atlantic coast [? of North Africa], depending on the progress of General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander-in-Chief, Middle East] and the transatlantic development of operation "Gymnast" [codename for the plans for the British occupation of North West Africa].