Telegram from Premier Joseph Stalin to WSC requesting his help in escorting steamers containing important war materials from Iceland to the Soviet Union.

Telegram from the Minister of State in the Middle East [Richard Casey] to WSC, reporting on the views of the Commanders-in-Chief, General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander-in-Chief, Middle East], Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder [Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, RAF, Middle East] and Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Pridham-Wippell [Second in Command, Mediterranean Fleet], particularly Auchinleck, with regard to the need for a postponement of projected land operations in Cyrenaica [Libya].

Telegram from WSC to General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander-in-Chief, Middle East] stating that his communication of 6 May is being considered by the Chiefs of Staff and the War Cabinet and that "all preparations for offensive as previously contemplated should continue.".

Telegram from WSC to the President of the United States [Franklin Roosevelt]: "Delighted to hear your good news from the Solomons" [victory over Japanese invasion fleet].

Telegram from WSC to General Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, conveying the view of the Chiefs of Staff, Defence Committee and War Cabinet that Auchinleck should attack the enemy and fight a major battle during May. Annotated by Francis Brown, Private Secretary to WSC, with note about further circulation.

Telegram from WSC to the Prime Minister of New Zealand [Peter Fraser] regarding Operation "Ironclad" [codename for operation against Diego Suarez, Madagascar]: "There were considerable risks which up to the present seem to have been successfully overridden.".

Telegram from WSC to Rear-Admiral [Edward] Neville Syfret and Major-General Robert Sturges [Commanders of taskforce for operation against Madagascar, "Ironclad"] congratulating them on the operation with an added remark for 29th Brigade only.

Telegram from WSC to Premier Joseph Stalin regarding convoys to the Soviet Union: outlines difficulties of sailing convoys to the Soviet Union; lists measures required from the Soviet Union to help protect convoys; states that he will be making the broadcast warning of British retaliation to German gas attacks upon Soviet Armies tomorrow.

Telegram from WSC to General Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, marked "most secret" stating the position of the Chiefs of Staff, the Defence Committee and the War Cabinet that "Malta shall not be allowed to fall without a battle being fought by your whole army for its retention"; comments on the implications if Malta should fall and states that the very latest date for engaging the enemy is one which provides a distraction for the June convoy.

Telegram from Rear-Admiral [Edward] Neville Syfret [Commander Force "H" Sea Command] marked "most secret" discussing the feasibility of further operations in Madagascar to capture Tamatave and Majunga.

Telegram from General Sir Archibald Wavell [Commander- in-Chief India] to WSC marked "most secret" regarding the situation in India: comments on estimates for the arrival of reinforcements; assesses principal dangers for the next two months; comments on problems of railway movement; promises to telegraph separately on the defences of Ceylon [later Sri Lanka]; states that all operations will depend mainly on the strength of air force that can be provided.

Telegram from WSC and Chiefs of Staff to Rear-Admiral [Edward] Neville Syfret [Commander Force "H" Sea Command] [Madagascar] marked "most secret" instructing him to abandon operations for the capture of Tamatave and Majunga, to concentrate on securing Diego Suarez, and to release troops for India.

Telegram from WSC to Premier Joseph Stalin marked "personal and most secret" informing him that a convoy of 35 ships sailed yesterday "with orders to fight their way through to you" but warning about possible severe losses from German bombers, stating that much will depend on the Soviet ability to bomb enemy aerodromes, and suggesting that, if losses are severe, it may be necessary to hold up further convoys until the ice recedes.

Telegram from General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander-in- Chief Middle East] to WSC marked "most secret" outlining his intentions for the immediate future and commenting on factors affecting the date of an offensive, including the timing of the Malta convoy, possible enemy action, and relative strengths of enemy and allied forces, and concluding that "the success of a major offensive cannot be regarded as in any way certain" and asking that it be given no publicity.

Telegram from Richard Casey [Minister of State in the Middle East] to WSC marked "most secret" suggesting that the Malta convoy should sail from the Gibraltar end of the Mediterranean not the Alexandria [Egypt] end and outlining his reasons.