Telegram from WSC to General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander-in-Chief, Middle East] asking him about "puff-balls" for use against tanks. [See CHAR 20/74/4 for reply].

Telegram from the Middle East Defence Committee to WSC and the Chiefs of Staff recommending that Lieutenant-General Sir William Dobbie [Governor and Commander-in-Chief, Malta] should be relieved and replaced by a young and vigorous Civil Governor.

Telegram from Field Marshal Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] to WSC commenting on operation "Ironclad" [occupation of Diego Suarez, Madagascar]: suggests that the towns of Tamatave and Majunga should also be occupied rendering the surrender of the whole island inevitable; offers to despatch a bomber squadron from Lindi [Tanzania] as soon as Diego aerodrome has been secured; comments on the need to rupture relations with Vichy France.

Telegram from Sir Walter Monckton [Director General of British Propaganda and Information Services, Cairo, Egypt] to WSC asking him to grant special additional quotas of immediate awards for gallantry in Malta. With annotation by WSC referring the matter to Sir Edward Bridges, Secretary to the War Cabinet, for action.

Telegram from the Governor of Malta [Lieutenant- General Sir William Dobbie] regarding the need for "most drastic action" to gain and maintain air superiority if Malta is to be held; comments on recent Spitfire losses and the urgent need for supplies.

Telegram from General Sir Archibald Wavell [Commander-in-Chief, India] reporting from Colombo on his visit to Ceylon [later Sri Lanka].

Telegram from WSC to Lieutenant General Sir William Dobbie [Governor of Malta] informing him of the Cabinet decision to send Richard Casey [Minister of State in the Middle East] to Malta.

Telegram from WSC to the President of the United States [Franklin Roosevelt]: comments on the contents of immediately following telegram [see CHAR 20/74/19-21]; comments on the situation in Malta and asks if USS Wasp can be used to carry Spitfire reinforcements; accepts proposals about dispositions of American heavy ships in the Atlantic.

Telegram from WSC to the President of the United States [Franklin Roosevelt] regarding immediate plans: comments on Malta, operation "Ironclad" [codename for operation against Diego Suarez, Madagascar], the Home Fleet, the Eastern Fleet, and the possibility of Admiral Sir James Somerville [Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet] escorting a major convoy to Malta.

Telegram from Rear-Admiral [Edward] Neville Syfret [Commander Force "H" Sea Command] marked "most secret" discussing the feasibility of further operations in Madagascar to capture Tamatave and Majunga.

Telegram from General Sir Archibald Wavell [Commander- in-Chief India] to WSC marked "most secret" regarding the situation in India: comments on estimates for the arrival of reinforcements; assesses principal dangers for the next two months; comments on problems of railway movement; promises to telegraph separately on the defences of Ceylon [later Sri Lanka]; states that all operations will depend mainly on the strength of air force that can be provided.

Telegram from WSC and Chiefs of Staff to Rear-Admiral [Edward] Neville Syfret [Commander Force "H" Sea Command] [Madagascar] marked "most secret" instructing him to abandon operations for the capture of Tamatave and Majunga, to concentrate on securing Diego Suarez, and to release troops for India.

Telegram from WSC to Premier Joseph Stalin marked "personal and most secret" informing him that a convoy of 35 ships sailed yesterday "with orders to fight their way through to you" but warning about possible severe losses from German bombers, stating that much will depend on the Soviet ability to bomb enemy aerodromes, and suggesting that, if losses are severe, it may be necessary to hold up further convoys until the ice recedes.

Telegram from General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander-in- Chief Middle East] to WSC marked "most secret" outlining his intentions for the immediate future and commenting on factors affecting the date of an offensive, including the timing of the Malta convoy, possible enemy action, and relative strengths of enemy and allied forces, and concluding that "the success of a major offensive cannot be regarded as in any way certain" and asking that it be given no publicity.

Telegram from Richard Casey [Minister of State in the Middle East] to WSC marked "most secret" suggesting that the Malta convoy should sail from the Gibraltar end of the Mediterranean not the Alexandria [Egypt] end and outlining his reasons.

Telegram from General Sir Archibald Wavell, Commander- in-Chief, India, to WSC marked "most secret" stating his belief in deceiving and disturbing the enemy by false information and advocating more coherent and long term deception plans worked between London, Washington [United States] and Commanders in the field using only officers with special qualifications.