Second World War (1939-1945)
Found in 2737 Collections and/or Records:
(Untitled), 26 Nov 1944
Telegram from General Dwight Eisenhower [Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force in Western Europe, United States Army] to WSC reporting on the position in the battle for Western Europe.
(Untitled), 27 Nov 1944
Telegram from General Dwight Eisenhower [Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force in Western Europe, United States Army] to WSC stating that his previous telegram [CHAR 20/175/120] should have been designated "Personal and Confidential" and reporting that he will be visiting both armies in 21st Army Group on 28 November.
(Untitled), 27 Nov 1944
Telegram from President Roosevelt to WSC marked "Personal and Top Secret" reporting that Lieutenant General Lucian Truscott has been ordered to report for duty as Commander of the 5th Army in Italy on 5 December.
(Untitled), 27 Nov 1944
Telegram from Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander [later Lord Alexander of Tunis, Commander of the Allied Armies in Italy] to WSC marked "Top Secret and Strictly Personal" informing him of how the 4th Queen's Own Hussars [of whom WSC is Colonel] will be employed.
(Untitled), 28 Nov 1944
Telegram from WSC to Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander [later Lord Alexander of Tunis, Commander of the Allied Armies in Italy] marked "Top Secret and Strictly Personal" indicating that he should do what he thinks best regarding the 4th Queen's Own Hussars [of whom WSC is Colonel].
(Untitled), 29 Nov 1944
Telegram from WSC to President Roosevelt marked "Personal and Top Secret" suggesting sending, and enclosing the text of, a message to Chiang Kai Shek [President of China] protesting at the proposed withdrawal of several divisions from the Chinese Army in India required for Operation Capital [campaign to drive from northern Burma (later Myanmar) to China].
(Untitled), 01 Dec 1944
Telegram from President Roosevelt to WSC marked "Personal and Top Secret" informing him that following a message from Major General Albert Wedemeyer [Commander United States Forces in the China Theatre] on the situation in China, the United States Chiefs of Staff do not support pressurising Chiang Kai Shek [President of China] over the removal of several divisions from the Chinese Army on the Burmese front.
(Untitled), 01 Dec 1944
Telegram from WSC to Marshal Stalin marked "Personal and Top Secret" regretting an incident in Yugoslavia [later Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Slovenia] where Russians were killed through a mistake by Allied aircraft and suggesting a revised boundary to the area in which air attacks may be carried out.
(Untitled), 02 Dec 1944
Telegram from WSC to Moscow [Soviet Union] conveying message to Marshal Stalin marked "Personal" appealing for co-operation over air attacks on enemy forces in Yugoslavia.
(Untitled), 02 Dec 1944
Telegram from WSC to President Roosevelt marked "Personal and Top Secret" agreeing with Roosevelt's position concerning Chinese forces being removed from the Burmese front to China; and with notifying the Russians on bombing plans in the Balkans.
(Untitled), 02 Dec 1944
Telegram from Acting Prime Minister of Australia [Francis Forde] to WSC agreeing to the arrangements for the administration for the Fleet being sent to the Pacific under Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser [Commander of the Pacific Fleet].
(Untitled), 03 Dec 1944
(Untitled), 03 Dec 1944
Telegram from Sir Archibald Clark Kerr [British Ambassador in the Soviet Union] to WSC marked "Top Secret" giving the amendments made to WSC's last message to Marshal Stalin on air attacks on enemy forces in Yugoslavia [later Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Slovenia].
(Untitled), 03 Dec 1944
Telegram from WSC to General Sir Henry Wilson [later 1st Lord Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean Theatre] and Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander [later Lord Alexander of Tunis, Commander of the Allied Armies in Italy] emphasising the importance of the situation in Greece and repeating the text of a telegram from Reginald Leeper [British Ambassador to Greece] objecting to the delay in replacing the 2nd Parachute Brigade.
(Untitled), 04 Dec 1944
Telegram from WSC to General Sir Henry Wilson [later 1st Lord Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean Theatre] and Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander [later Lord Alexander of Tunis, Commander of the Allied Armies in Italy] marked "Private and Top Secret" stressing that their first task is victory in Athens [Greece].
(Untitled), 03 Dec 1944
(Untitled), 04 Dec 1944
Telegram from General Sir Adrian Carton de Wiart [Special Military Representative with Chiang Kai Shek, President of China] to WSC marked "For Prime Minister Only" stating that he agrees with Chiang Kai Shek's decision to withdraw three divisions from the Burmese front to try to hold Kunming [China]. Copy.
(Untitled), 04 Dec 1944
(Untitled), 05 Dec 1944
Telegram from WSC to President Roosevelt marked "Personal and Top Secret" endorsing the transfer of two Chinese divisions from the Burmese front to China to meet Japanese advances there, provided Allied forces are not weakened; and bombing plans in the Balkans.
(Untitled), 06 Dec 1944
(Untitled), 07 Dec 1944
(Untitled), 07 Dec 1944
(Untitled), 07 Dec 1944
Telegram from WSC to General Sir Adrian Carton de Wiart [Special Military Representative with Chiang Kai Shek, President of China] marked "Personal and Top Secret" stating that he does not oppose the withdrawal of the Chinese divisions from Burma [later Myanmar] to China and that the best way of doing so is being examined.
(Untitled), 08 Dec 1944
Telegram from Marshal Stalin to WSC marked "Personal and Top Secret" stating that the Soviet General Staff have agreed to the new division of activities between the Soviet and Allied forces in Yugoslavia [later Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Slovenia].
(Untitled), 09 Dec 1944
Telegram from General Sir Henry Wilson [later 1st Lord Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean Theatre] to WSC marked "Personal" suggesting that Marshal Tito's [Premier of Yugoslavia] assessment of the military situation in Yugoslavia [later Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Slovenia] as contained in the last message from Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean [Liaison Officer with Tito] is over optimistic.