First World War (1914-1918)
Found in 1504 Collections and/or Records:
(Untitled), 20 Mar 1915
Telegram from Vice Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles, to Admiralty, report on condition of ships damaged in attack on the Narrows, praising the gallantry of the French squadron under Rear-Admiral Guepratte [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 21 Mar 1915
Telegram from Vice-Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles, to Admiralty, on damage to forts from Naval bombardment [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 21 Mar 1915
Telegram from Vice-Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles, to Admiralty, on preparations for minesweeping operations [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 21 Mar 1915
Telegram from Vice-Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles to Admiralty, reporting that officers and men of lost ships would be sent home at the first opportunity [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 23 Mar 1915
Telegram from Vice-Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles to Admiralty, report on meeting with General Sir Ian Hamilton and Major-General William Birdwood, who had stated that the army would not be in a position to undertake any military operations before 14 Apr. He also discusses the plan to land a force inside the Dardanelles to destroy guns guarding the Straits. [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 23 Mar 1915
Telegram from Rear-Admiral Rosslyn Wemyss (later Lord Wester Wemyss), Mudros, to Admiralty, reporting loss of Torpedo Boat 064, wrecked during Northerly gale on East side of Lemnos [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 24 Mar 1915
Telegram from Vice Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles, to Admiralty, reporting that no operations were possible due to strong NE wind. Also reporting on repairs to HMS "Inflexible" [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 24 Mar 1915
Telegram from WSC, First Lord of the Admiralty to Vice Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles, stating that it was clear that the army should prepare to attack the Kilid Bahr plateau at the earliest opportunity, and that the Admiralty had to decide whether the time had come to abandon the naval plan of forcing the Dardanelles without military assistance "It may be necessary to accept the check of he 18th as decisive and to admit that the task is beyond our powers" [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 26 Mar 1915
Telegram from Vice-Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles, to Admiralty, reporting that he did not consider the defeat on 18 Mar decisive, but that he considered that a combined operation was essential to "obtain great results and object of campaign" [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 27 Mar 1915
Telegram from Vice-Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles, to WSC, First Lord of the Admiralty, stating that he did not consider the defeat of 18 Mar to be decisive, but that he felt that a combined operation would have the best chance of success. Giving options for Combined Operations [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 27 Mar 1915
Telegram from WSC, First Lord of the Admiralty, to Vice-Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles, accepting his reasons for proposing a combined operation, and stating that he intended him to remain in command irrespective of the recovery Vice Admiral Sackville Carden [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 27 Mar 1915
Telegram from WSC, First Lord of the Admiralty, to Vice-Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles, asking what action the Fleet would take if the army was checked at Kilid Bahr, and asking him not to be vexed by WSC's enquiries "the only thing is to win".
(Untitled), 28 Mar 1915
Telegram from Naval Base, Mudros to Admiralty requesting increase in supply of ordnance to 1000 6 inch and 2000 12 pounder shrapnel shells per day, for use supporting military operations in the Dardanelles [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 28 Mar 1915
Telegram from Admiralty to C. in C., East Indies, repeated to Vice-Admiral Eastern Mediterranean Squadron, John De Robeck, orders to send all available ships from Egypt to operate outside the Dardanelles on the day troops were to be landed [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 28 Mar 1915
Telegram from Admiralty to Rear-Admiral Rosslyn Wemyss (later Lord Wester Wemyss), Lemnos, orders to isolate the island and allow no communication with the "outer world" [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 29 Mar 1915
Telegram from Vice-Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles, to WSC, First Lord of the Admiralty, on combined military and naval attack on the Narrows [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 29 Mar 1915
Telegram from Vice-Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles, to Admiralty, reporting unsuccessful German air attack on HMS "Ark Royal" [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 31 Mar 1915
Telegram from Vice-Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles, to Admiralty, report in progress of minesweeping operations [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 01 Apr 1915
Telegram from Vice-Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles, to Admiralty, situation report [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 02 Apr 1915
Telegram from Admiralty to Vice-Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles, asking for full details of preparations for landing the Army, and for mine sweeping [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 02 Apr 1915
Telegram from Vice-Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles to Admiralty, on preparations for landing the Army, which would require two Captains, 3 Commanders, 27 Lieutenants, 24 Warrant and Subordinate Officers and 700 men [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 03 Apr 1915
Telegram from Vice-Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles to WSC, First Lord of the Admiralty, on plan for combined attack on the Narrows [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 03 Apr 1915
Telegram from Vice-Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles to Admiralty, report in minesweeping operations inside the Straits [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 03 Apr 1915
Telegram from Vice-Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles to Admiralty, on collaboration with the Russian Fleet so that Russian attack on the Bosphorus [Karadeniz Bogazi, Turkey] should synchronize with British attack on the Dardanelles. [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 03 Apr 1915
Telegram from WSC, First Lord of the Admiralty to Vice-Admiral John De Robeck, Dardanelles, asking for full report after meeting with General Sir Ian Hamilton. Stating that his special cipher "B" was absolutely secret and h could dismiss all ideas of leakage. Ordering him not to discuss WSC's "personal and secret" telegrams with anyone except his Chief of Staff, and General Hamilton [typescript copy].