Letter from [WSC] (41 Cromwell Road) to Edward Grimwood Mears denying Sir George Arthur's assertion that Lord Kitchener was opposed to the naval attack on the Dardanelles and complaining that the propagation of this idea by members of Kitchener's entourage has led to unjust attacks in the press on WSC. Annotated typescript copy.

Statement to the Dardanelles Commission of Inquiry by Sir George Arthur that Lord Kitchener had protested against a naval attack on the Dardanelles unsupported by the army and that WSC had replied that the power of the guns of the "Queen Elizabeth" made a purely naval attack a practical proposition. Typescript copy.

Statement by [Lord Kitchener] to the War Council that he had doubted whether a purely naval attack on the Dardanelles would succeed but was led to believe it was possible by WSC's statements about the power of the 'Queen Elizabeth' and the Admiralty staff paper showing how the operations were to be conducted. He did not believe that once the army was in Gallipoli the 'Queen Elizabeth' would be withdrawn and he believes that this withdrawal will have serious consequences. Typescript copy.

Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Tom Bridges (Ritz Hotel, Piccadilly, London) to WSC justifying the recent offensives on the Western Front and stating that tanks will have to be made faster before complete confidence can be placed in them. Thinks the idea of body shields contains "the germs of salvation".

"Remarks by Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson on the paper and evidence of Major-General [Thomas] Hickman". Argues against Hickman's assertion that high-angle fire rather than the use of low trajectory high velocity guns would be most suitable for the bombardment of the Dardanelles forts. Printed.

Extract from the minutes of the 96th meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence on 18 February 1907 at which it was decided that an attempt to force the Dardanelles by a landing in Gallipoli would be very risky. Reprinted for the Committee on 5 September 1916.

Minute by WSC stating that the Dardanelles operations could easily develop into a great siege and calling for the following measures: the provision of siege artillery and well-equipped semi-permanent landing stages; protection against submarines; the fitting of the bombarding fleet with mine protection; the provision of seventy aircraft. Printed copy.

Minute by WSC on the despatch of howitzers and monitors to the Dardanelles and their use there. Printed copy.

Letter from WSC to Arthur Balfour [later Lord Balfour] on the measures needed to protect the Dardanelles fleet from submarine attack. Printed copy.

"A note by the Admiralty Transport Department. Move of the 52nd (Lowland) Division." Includes copies of documents from May 1915. Printed.

Cabinet memorandum by Lord Selborne explaining why he agrees with WSC that the operations in Gallipoli should be continued and supported as much as is necessary (4 Jun 1915). Printed Feb 1917.

Telegram from General Sir Ian Hamilton to the War Office reporting that he has abandoned the idea of landing troops on the Bulair Isthmus.

"Note on the transport question. Circulated to the Dardanelles Committee by the First Lord of the Admiralty [Arthur Balfour], June 18, 1915. Printed copy.

Letter from Major-General Charles Callwell (War Office) to WSC (21 Arlington Street) on: the need to get Bulgaria on the Allied side before Germany makes a successful attack on Serbia; the activity of Russian forces in the Caucasus and Armenia; the withdrawal of some Turkish troops from the Caucasus to Constantinople. Printed copy.

Letter from WSC to Arthur Balfour [later Lord Balfour] on the need for aircraft and 12-inch monitors in the Dardanelles. Printed copy.

Letter from WSC to [Herbert Asquith, later 1st Lord Oxford and Asquith] on the losses and strength of the four territorial divisions engaged in the recent battles [in Gallipoli]. Printed copy.

Letter from WSC (72 Brook Street) to Arthur Balfour [later Lord Balfour] asking him to have produced a report on weather conditions in the Dardanelles in October, November and December and to see Commodore Roger Backhouse about the naval guns which have not yet been landed. Expresses anxiety that the sanitary conditions should be adequate for the winter campaign. Printed copy.

Cabinet memorandum by WSC rejecting the view that the establishment by the Germans of through communications with Constantinople will immediately make the Allied army's position in Gallipoli untenable. Reprinted February 1917.

War Committee notes by WSC on: the need for the troops in Gallipoli to be supplied with new gas respirators; the justification of using gas against the Turks; the opportunity to learn from problems encountered by the French in the recruitment of native troops. Printed copy.

Dardanelles Commission of Inquiry: draft of WSC's statement on operations to the end of the first phase. Manuscript in WSC's hand and typescript. Includes: (at folio 3) letter of 23 Aug 1916 from Alexander MacCallum Scott to WSC enclosing a suggested synopsis of his main points (at folios 5-8) and advising him on how to treat the decision to abandon the naval assault.

"Dardanelles Inquiry. Statement by Mr Churchill upon the Dardanelles Operations to the end of the first phase." Printed draft with annotations by WSC.

Dardanelles Commission of Inquiry: statement by WSC on operations to the end of the first phase. Printed proof.