Telegram from WSC to John Curtin [Prime Minister of Australia] marked "secret and personal" thanking him for his personal concern about the broadcast criticising the Middle East Command which was not heard in the United Kingdom.

Telegram from John Curtin (Prime Minister of Australia) to WSC marked "most secret" accepting WSC's amended proposals regarding the monthly delivery of Spitfires and describing Japanese raid no. 67 on Port Moresby [Papua New Guinea] on 4 July.

Telegram from John Curtin [Prime Minister of Australia] to WSC marked "most secret" commenting on the report he has received from Herbert Evatt [Australian Minister for External Affairs and Attorney General] on the results of his mission to London: thanks WSC for his assurances of support and practical assistance, including provision of three Spitfire squadrons and an RAF squadron, and proposes to express his Government's appreciation in the Australian parliament.

Telegram from Lord Halifax [British Ambassador to the United States, earlier Edward Wood and Lord Irwin] to WSC reporting on his meeting with the President of the United States [Franklin Roosevelt] and Harry Hopkins [Special adviser and assistant to Roosevelt] late last night regarding Australian representation in the Pacific area and the Australian division in the Middle East.

Telegram from WSC to Prime Minister of Canada [Mackenzie King], Prime Minister of Australia [John Curtin] and Prime Minister of New Zealand [Peter Fraser] marked " most secret and personal" informing them that the "great battle in Egypt has opened well" and commenting on the situation in the western desert. Refers to the valiant role of the New Zealanders (to Prime Minister of New Zealand only) and the 9th Australian Division (to Prime Minister of Australia only).

Telegram from President Roosevelt to WSC marked "personal and secret" reciting the text of the message he has sent to John Curtin [Prime Minister of Australia] urging him not to withdraw the 9th Division of the Australian Imperial Force from the Middle East and offering to dispatch a United States Division to Australia from Hawaii.

Telegram from WSC to President Roosevelt marked "personal and secret" expressing gratitude for his help in persuading John Curtin [Prime Minister of Australia] not to withdraw Australian Division from the Middle East.

Telegram from Prime Minister of Australia [John Curtin] to WSC marked "most secret" thanking WSC for the information about the Middle East, but stressing the "vital importance" of the return of the 9th Division of the Australian Imperial Force to Australia as soon as possible, and asking WSC to use his personal interest in ensuring the fullest co-operation by all concerned.

Telegram from WSC to Prime Minister of Australia [John Curtin] marked "most secret and personal" confirming that he understands his wishes and assuring him of his personal interest [regarding the return of the 9th Division of the Australian Imperial Force from the Middle East to Australia].

Telegram from WSC to the Prime Minister of Australia [John Curtin] on the co-ordination of defence between Britain, the United States, Australia and New Zealand, including the need to incorporate the United States contribution into the south western Pacific, and the defence of Australia itself; Australian, New Zealander and Dutch representatives will report via London to Washington until a Supreme Commander has been appointed.

Telegram from the Prime Minister of Australia, John Curtin, to WSC urging air-borne reinforcement of Malaya [later Malaysia] before the 8th Australian Division fight a decisive battle against the Japanese.

Telegram from WSC to the Prime Minister of New Zealand [Peter Fraser] sympathising with his complaints about lack of support [see telegram T 42/2, CHAR 20/68A/60-66] and explaining developments for defence of the Anzac [Australian and New Zealand Army Corps] area, especially a representative council in London, and the scope of the ABDA [Australian, British, Dutch and Australasian] area.

Telegram from the Prime Minister of Australia, John Curtin, to WSC on disagreements over the defence of Malaya [later Malaysia] and the speed of Japanese advance and vulnerability of Australia if Singapore falls.

Telegram from WSC to the Prime Minister of Australia [John Curtin] on subjects including: denying personal responsibility for lack of preparation for war; relating the threat in the Middle East to European and Japanese campaigns; the development of military strategy; details of ships lost and the future build-up of naval power in the Indian Ocean and Pacific.

Telegrams from WSC to the Prime Minister of Australia [John Curtin] and to the Prime Minister of New Zealand [Peter Fraser] with a proposal for a Far Eastern council in London to co-ordinate the governments of Australia, New Zealand and the Netherlands in the conduct of war against Japan.

Telegram from the Prime Minister of Australia [John Curtin] to WSC advising that the Australian War Cabinet rejects the proposed Far Eastern Council in London and requires an Australian representative on the War Cabinet and authorised Government representatives from Britain, the United States, Australia, China, the Netherlands and New Zealand to formulate policy as a Pacific War Council in Washington.

Telegram from WSC to the Prime Minister of Australia [John Curtin] suggesting that he has misunderstood the proposed Far Eastern Council and that it would not be a purely advisory body; agreeing to Curtin's request [for an Australian representative on the War Cabinet]; asks if the British Government should put Curtin's suggestion of [a Pacific War Council] to the United States Government.

Telegram from John Curtin [Prime Minister of Australia] to WSC with the views of the Chiefs of Staff on the threat of Japanese invasion of Australia and on defence: safety depends on maintaining the Allied position in Malaya [later Malaysia] and the Dutch East Indies [later Indonesia], and on the United States Fleet increasing pressure on Japanese southern communications; United States reinforcements required to increase land forces.

Telegram from WSC to the Prime Minister of Australia [John Curtin] responding to criticism of Britain's conduct of the war: explains that Malaya [later Malaysia] cannot be defended and only Singapore is vital and supports the decisions of [General Sir Archibald Wavell], Supreme Commander, South West Pacific; discusses the general direction of the war, strategy in the 'Anzac' [Australian and New Zealand Army Corps] area and United States naval contribution towards defence.

Telegram from WSC to the Prime Minister of New Zealand [Peter Fraser] with proposals agreed by the United States Naval Staff and the President of the United States [Franklin Roosevelt] for establishing a new Anzac [Australian and New Zealand Army Corps] naval area, including a definition of the area and allocation of forces.

Telegrams from WSC to John Curtin, Prime Minister of Australia, on the safe arrival in Singapore of a convoy including the United States transport ship Mount Vernon; with proposals agreed by United States Naval Staff and the President of the United States [Franklin Roosevelt] for establishing the new Anzac [Australian and New Zealand Army Corps] naval area, including a definition of the area and allocation of forces.

Telegram from WSC to the Prime Minister of Australia [John Curtin] with text of a telegram from General Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] to Sidney Waterson [High Commissioner for South Africa in London]: Australia should have a representative on the War Cabinet to reward "magnificent war effort and present danger in Far East", although South Africa does not need a similar arrangement; Smuts adds his support for WSC.

Telegram from Mackenzie King [Prime Minister of Canada] to John Curtin [Prime Minister of Australia] with the text of his statement in the Canadian House of Commons on the composition of the Imperial War Cabinet, and the power of decision still resting with the British War Cabinet: Australia's request for a right to a permanent equal voice in the British War Cabinet differs from Canadian requests.