Correspondence with Winston Churchill on subjects including: Seal's suggestion of a week's leave for the staff at Christmas, 1940; an offer for Seal of a place at the Admiralty as Under Secretary, and his decision to stay with Churchill, December 1940; the proposal from [Albert] A V Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty (enclosed) that Seal should head a team of civilian Admiralty staff in Washington, with Churchill's response that it was his duty to go; Seal's first impressions of apathy in the United States and Franklin Roosevelt's reluctance to act, his work in getting the new Canadian naval base at St John's, Newfoundland, set up and his prayer that Churchill would be spared to finish his great task; his success in welding three separate Admiralty missions to the United States into one; the likelihood of teething issues with American shipbuilding and repairs and Seal's concerns about the lack of adequate repair provision on the Canadian eastern seaboard and difficulties in getting the Americans to co-operate; good reaction to Churchill's talks with Roosevelt at Casablanca [Morocco] and to his broadcasts; encouraging Churchill to write his war memoirs and comparing him to Julius Caesar as a war leader who was capable of writing a classic; Seal's distress at Churchill's loss of the General Election in 1945 and his fear of a humanitarian catastrophe in Germany in the coming winter; Seal's pride in having worked with Churchill during the grimmest and hardest part of the war.

Also includes two memoranda sent to Churchill by Seal: firstly in April 1940, advising a greater concentration on Scandinavia, in order to prevent iron ore from Sweden and Norway from reaching Germany; and secondly in April 1941 with his general reflections on the state of the war, annotated by Churchill, particularly suggesting firstly, following the idea of Harry Hopkins [Special Adviser and Assistant to President of the United States] that American forces should help in West Africa (annotated by Churchill that it was no use badgering them to do what they knew already); secondly that American influence should be brought to bear on the Soviet Union to bring them into the war (with the comment 'What good would that do'); and thirdly increasing the importance of underground resistance and sabotage (with a note that Churchill did not propose to create a separate department).