Royal Navy
Found in 1960 Collections and/or Records:
(Untitled), 01 Nov 1940 - 30 Nov 1940
(Untitled), 18 Oct 1939
Memorandum by WSC, First Lord of the Admiralty, for the War Cabinet entitled "Possible Detente with Italy in the Mediterranean"; discusses need to build up common interests with Italy, perhaps in the Balkans, and to keep U-boat war out of the Mediterranean.
(Untitled), 03 Nov 1939
Printed paper by WSC for the War Cabinet entitled "Statement by the First Lord to the French Admiralty"; discusses the uses of "asdics" [anti-submarine detection indicator], the necessity of defeating U-boats to control the seas, and future strategy.
(Untitled), 17 Nov 1939
Memorandum by WSC, First Lord of the Admiralty, for the War Cabinet entitled "Australian Naval Defence (Winter 1939)"; suggests that Japan will reserve its strength for controlling China and not attempt to attack Singapore or Australia, therefore the Australian army can be dispatched wherever necessary. [expanded to produce CHAR 20/15/11].
(Untitled), 21 Nov 1939
Memorandum by WSC, First Lord of the Admiralty, for the War Cabinet entitled "Australian and New Zealand Naval Defence (Winter 1939)". [expands on content of CHAR 20/15/10].
(Untitled), 12 Mar 1940
Printed note by WSC, First Lord of the Admiralty, for the War Cabinet entitled "Comparison of British and Japanese Fleets"; discusses capacity of British Fleet which can be spared for the Far East, assuming the French Fleet will command Home Waters, with tables showing projected Capital Ship strengths in 1942, with dates of completion of ships.
(Untitled), Sep 1939-May 1940
(Untitled), 09 Jun 1940
Letter from WSC to [Major-General Hastings] Ismay [Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence] and copied to Colonel [Ian] Jacob [Military Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet] on the needless delay over operation "Paul" [mining of Scandinavian shipping channels to prevent ore being exported to Germany]; comments on the Illustrious being wasted when it is needed to collect aeroplanes from the United States. [carbon copy].
(Untitled), 07 Jun 1940 - 08 Jun 1940
Minute from the 1st Sea Lord [Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound] to WSC informing him that after the evacuation of Narvik [Norway] is finished the Ark Royal will carry out Operation Paul [mining of Scandinavian shipping channels to prevent ore being exported to Germany] in a modified form. Annotated by WSC on 8 June: "Good".
(Untitled), 06 Jun 1940
Memorandum from "D P" [Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, 1st Sea Lord] to WSC and copied to First Lord [of the Admiralty, A V Alexander, later 1st Lord Alexander of Hillsborough], explaining modifications to Operation Paul [mining of Scandinavian shipping channels to prevent ore being exported to Germany], necessary due to ice in the Gulf of Bothnia and the German occupation of Norwegian aerodromes; annotated by WSC.
(Untitled), 06 Jun 1940
Draft minute from WSC to 1st Sea Lord [Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound] and copied to First Lord [of the Admiralty, A V Alexander, later 1st Lord Alexander of Hillsborough] insisting that Operation Paul [mining of Scandinavian shipping channels to prevent ore being exported to Germany] go ahead in some form; suggests aerodromes at "Bardufoss" and "Skaanland" [both Norway] be bombed.
(Untitled), 05 Jun 1940
(Untitled), 02 Apr 1941
Letter from WSC to the First Lord [of the Admiralty, A V Alexander, later 1st Lord Alexander of Hillsborough] informing him that it is: "the duty of the naval authorities to carry out the approved policy of the transference of men from other shipbuilding and ship-repairing tasks to merchant ship repair work". [typescript copy].
(Untitled), 05 Apr 1941
Letter from WSC to King [George VI] on the consequences of the Royal Navy engaging the French ship Dunquerque: stating that if France declared war or handed over her Fleet and bases to Germany, Britain would need US aid, but that this is unlikely because there was little reaction to the bombardment of Oran [Algeria], and the USA has made strong representations to Admiral [Jean] Darlan [Vice-Premier of Vichy France]. [draft carbon].
(Untitled), 13 Oct 1941
Letter from WSC to Emanuel Shinwell agreeing that something should be done to reduce the size of convoys and the matter is under review by the First Lord of the Admiralty [A V Alexander].
(Untitled), 17 Oct 1941
Telegram from Prime Minister of Australia [John Curtin] urging that re-disposition of first class units to eastern hemisphere will include a modern capital ship to deter Japan.
(Untitled), 25 Oct 1941
Telegram from WSC to the Prime Minister of Australia [John Curtin] advising that evacuation of Tobruk [Libya] has begun; doubts that Japan will attack until the Soviet Union falls; will send new battleship Prince of Wales to join Repulse in Indian Ocean.
(Untitled), 05 Nov 1941
Telegram from WSC to the Prime Minister of Canada [Mackenzie King] on sending of Prince of Wales to join Repulse in the Indian Ocean, to contain Tirpitz.
(Untitled), 09 Nov 1941
Telegram from WSC to the President of the United States [Franklin Roosevelt] informing him of destruction of 2 Axis convoys to Benghazi [Libya].
(Untitled), 18 Nov 1941
Telegram from General Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] to WSC on talks with Admiral Sir Tom Phillips [Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet]; expresses doubts about capability of 2 separate fleets to combat superior Japanese fleet.
(Untitled), 07 Jul 1942
Letter and memorandum from Stanley Bruce [High Commissioner for Australia in London] to WSC urging greater defence to maintain convoys to the Soviet Union.
(Untitled), 23 Jul 1942
Letter from WSC to Stanley Bruce [High Commissioner for Australia in London] thanking him for the note on Soviet convoys, stressing the importance of controlling sea communications.
(Untitled), 04 Mar 1942
Letter from WSC to Admiral of the Fleet 1st Lord Chatfield explaining delays in completion of capital ships, such as Lion and Temeraire.
(Untitled), 20 Oct 1942
(Untitled), 31 Oct 1942
Letter from WSC to the President of the United States [Franklin Roosevelt] with major points of joint strategy: expansion of shipping convoys against U-boat attack; increase of food imports in 1943; more American troops to Britain; increasing bombing, night bombing and using aircraft against U-boats.